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ABSTRACT
U.S. defense policy has often relied on a strategy of nation-building to reform the local
government and address the root causes of the instability in a given nation or region. This
strategy has, in recent years, been criticized for being ineffective and a wasteful drain on
American resources. This paper will determine if such criticism is valid by analyzing the
performance of four security environments where such a strategy was used: Vietnam, El
Salvador, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The paper will determine if such a strategy was effective in
these conflicts by analyzing the progress of reforms and, when possible, the final outcome of the
conflict.
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INTRODUCTION

There is currently a debate over the role and utility of nation-building in U.S. defense
policy. Some argue nation-building is not useful and that the U.S. should focus solely on its
conventional military capability.1 Others argue that there has not been enough investment into
nation-building and that America’s efforts in conflicts like Afghanistan have suffered because of
it.2 This paper will delve into this debate by analyzing four insurgencies that America has been
involved in: the Vietnam War (1955-1975), the El Salvador Civil War (1979-1992), the
Afghanistan War (2001-the present), and the Iraq War (2003-2011). These four cases could be
considered some of the largest of the “small wars” America has been involved. Due to the size
and scope of nation-building in each of these nations and the fact that there were internal wars
on-going, America’s nation-building effectiveness as a defense policy tool was tested. In each of
these case studies the goal will be to determine how nation-building affected the overall stability
and security in the given nation. This will be determined through several factors. The extent to
which the government reformed to deal with the main drivers of the war, the end-result of the
war, and opinion polls when available. In cases where the conflict ended but resumed soon after
the U.S. left the country, that will also be taken into account, Using the findings from these case
studies, a conclusion about nation-building’s effectiveness and to what extent it is useful as a
way to end conflict will be determined. Before going further however, we first need to define

1

Bing West, “After a Decade of Counter-insurgency, Eliminate Nation-Building from US Military Manuals,” In The
New Counter-insurgency Era in Critical Perspective edited by Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones, M.L.R.
Smith, pp. 232-239, Rethinking Political Violence series (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); and Steven
Metz, “Abandoning Counterinsurgency: Revising Antiterrorism Strategy,” Parameters 47 no. 3 (2017), pp. 51–64,
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/Parameters/Issues/Autumn_2017/5_Metz.pdf.
2
James Dobbins, “Nation Building after Iraq,” Lecture, Smart Power Speaker Series from Center for Strategic and
International Studies (Washington, DC, June 4, 2008); and Max Boot and Michael Miklaucic, “USAID Should
Become the Department of Nation-Building,” Foreign Policy, June 22, 2016,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/22/usaid-should-become-the-department-of-nation-building/.
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nation-building and the theory behind it.
It is important to differentiate the academic use of the word nation-building, with the
foreign policy use of the word. In the academic world, nation-building and state-building
technically mean two very different types of activity. “Nation” is the common identity that binds
the various people of the country together. “State” is the government’s ability to deliver public
goods, such as electricity and security.3 However, in the military and foreign policy realm,
nation-building is frequently combined with process of state-building. This is due to the fact that,
in practice, countries in which there is conflict often lack both “nation” and “state”. Statebuilding can also be used to help create a nation, and vice-versa. As a result, nation-building in
the foreign policy realm can be defined as: the process which generates a government that can
provide a sufficient level of services and political representation so that all its citizens view that
government as legitimate. It is this policy definition of nation-building which will be used
throughout the paper, as it encompasses all the aspects of the policy approach.
The applicability for nation-building in the wars being discussed can be seen in the
Army’s Counterinsurgency Manual which states explicitly on the first page that, “Defeating an
insurgency requires a blend of both civilian and military efforts that address both assisting the
host-nation government in defeating the insurgents on the battlefield and enabling the host nation
in addressing the root causes of the insurgency.”4 In another section, the manual advises that,
“Commanders and staffs must understand the nature of intrastate conflicts even if they are poorly
defined. If a commander and staff misdiagnosis an intrastate conflict, they can fail to properly

3

Armin von Bogdandy, Stefan Häuβler, Felix Hanschmann and Raphael Utz, “State-Building, Nation-Building, and
Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an Appraisal of Different
Approaches,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 9, no. 1 (2005): pp. 579-613, DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1163/187574105X00138, pp, 580-588.
4
Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), p. 1-1.
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identify and address the root cause of instability and the nature of the threat.”5 The manual also
has entire chapters devoted to “Culture”, “Indirect Methods to Countering Insurgencies”, and
“Working with Host-Nation Forces.”6 It is clear through directions given not only by the Army’s
Counterinsurgency Manual but also by the Joint Publication on Counterinsurgency published by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the non-military factors of an insurgency are as important as the
actual killing of the enemy.7
There are two methods in nation-building to deal with these non-military factors. One is
co-option, which is the process of reforming existing state institutions. The second is
deconstruction, which is when the entire government is destroyed and rebuilt. Co-option has
been used in all of the nation-building America has been involved in, though was most used in
Vietnam and El Salvador. Afghanistan and Iraq are the only examples in this paper’s case studies
in which deconstruction was used. Why co-option is used in one country and deconstruction used
in another is the result of the policy maker’s judgement of the viability of the regime.8
A good way to think of a nation is to symbolize it as a house. The goal of nation-building
is to fix those parts of the house which are unstable. In some cases, such as Iraq and Afghanistan,
the entire house is viewed as unsalvageable, requiring it to be entirely rebuilt. In others, like
Vietnam and El Salvador, the house is kept in-tact, but an effort is made to fix the parts of it that
are unstable and threaten to bring the rest of the house down. The basic theory behind nationbuilding is that by fixing the structure of the country from which the instability originates, the
rebellion against the government will dissipate and the country will become stable once again.
5

Ibid., p. 4-2.
Ibid., Chapters 3, 10, 11.
7
Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, pp. 1-1, 1-8, 1-15, 1-18 and Chapters 3, 10, 11; and Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Counterinsurgency. JP 3-24 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), pp. I-6 to I-8, III-5, III-12 to
III-13, III-18 to III-20, III-35, IV-19 to IV-21.
8
James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse, The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG557.pdf, pp. xx-xxi.
6
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What exactly is required to create a stable country is up for interpretation. Heather Selma
Gregg, in her book Building the Nation, creates “six pillars of stabilization” which are: Security,
Law, Governance, Economics, Social Well-being, and National Unity.9 The Beginner’s Guide to
Nation-Building by James Dobbins et al. also has six factors: Security, Humanitarian Relief,
Governance, Economic Stabilization, Democratization, and Development.10 While these two lists
are similar, with the two sharing some common factors, there are also some noticeable
differences. There can also be differences in how one measures the importance of each of these
factors. James Dobbins has a hierarchy with security being the most important. Heather Selma
Gregg, by contrast, views each of her pillars as equally important.
While such criteria are useful, they do lack specificity. What is sufficient governance for
one country may be insufficient for another. In addition, there is the fact that insurgencies
usually do not form due to a state lacking in all areas, but often in just two or three. It can also be
the case that some aspect of governance is a driver, but others are not. As a result, instead of
using a broad set of factors that can be applied to every country, this paper will focus on the
specific factors that were most important for that particular conflict. Using this approach will
allow greater attention to be given to the issues that most matter for each case study, as all four
are unique with differing circumstances.
For Vietnam, there was one main driver: the state’s lack of a positive presence in the
countryside. Some areas of the country had no interaction with the central government, and those
that did tended do so only in the form of being taxed. Thus, the goal of nation-building was to
extend the reach of the government outside the cities. There would be two general techniques
used to do so. The first was through demographics. The United States would help fund
9

Heather Selma Gregg, Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan (Lincoln, NE: Potomac
Books, 2018), p. 88 and Table 3.
10
James Dobbins, et al, The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building, p. xxiii.
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Vietnam’s effort to move populations that were loyal to the government to areas that were not,
through refugee resettlement and the Land Development Program. The second was by striving to
make the people’s lives better through population control programs like the Strategic Hamlet
Program which would bring both security and government services. This also included land
reform to increase the financial prospects of the peasants. The section on Vietnam will also have
a focus on the Central Highlands, as this region had never been controlled by a central authority
and were most disconnected from the Vietnamese nation-state. In the end, it will be shown that
while nation-building showed success, it came too late to be of use.
For El Salvador, the main issue was the brutal oligarchic system of government,
controlled by the agricultural elite and the military. The three ways the United States would
attempt to destroy this oligarchic system was by promoting human rights, democracy, and land
reform. Land reform would destroy the agricultural elite’s power and help to alleviate the
economic inequality in the country. Democracy would give the people political power to ensure
that the land owners and military do not oppress them again. Finally, the promotion of a culture
that respects human rights would cause supporters of the insurgency not to fear being killed if
they stopped fighting and participated in the political system. While unable to fully reform the
government, the United States was able to push El Salvador to reform enough that it was able to
negotiate with the rebel forces and achieve peace.
In Afghanistan, the main drivers are governance, corruption, and the opium drug trade.
The issue of governance is mainly related to the warlords in the country who treat their regions
as mini-kingdoms to be exploited and dominated. This has caused many of the legitimate local
leaders to either be killed or alienated, causing the central government as a whole to be viewed as
illegitimate. Corruption has caused the government to be unable to meet many of the

5

population’s needs and has caused villages to at least tolerate the Taliban for the services and
better management they offer. The drug trade has caused Afghanistan to have a large illegal
economy which the Taliban are heavily involved in. This results in many farmers not benefitting
as much from state services, such as subsidies and infrastructure, as they would under a legal
economy and causes Taliban services, such as protection of farms and free transportation of
goods, to be more beneficial. In summary, the Afghan government lacks both legitimacy and the
ability to fully provide for its citizens’ needs.
In Iraq, the main issue that drove the insurgency was sectarianism (the conflict between
the Sunni and the Shia sects of Islam). As will be shown, the year-long American occupation of
Iraq did not account for the level of disorder that accompanied the destruction of Saddam’s
regime. Yet while actions such as de-Baathification, the dissolving of the military, and the
inability to create a strong interim government in the early months after liberation would have
consequences of their own right, sectarianism would magnify all these problems. The inability of
the United States to solve this fundamental issue would cause what seemed to be a successful
nation-building effort to ultimately turn into a failure as conflict resumed soon after American
forces left the country.

6

SOUTH VIETNAM

Nation-building in South Vietnam was largely about expanding the reach of the
government into the rural areas. It was these rural areas that were the least developed, least
connected to the idea of the Vietnamese nation, and most susceptible to insurgent propaganda.
Thus, this analysis will be about those programs that focused on transforming rural South
Vietnam. These government extension techniques were: the settlement of refugees, the Land
Development Program, population control, and land reform. In addition, there will be a section
focusing on the Central Highlands, as this was an area that was particularly disconnected from
the Vietnamese nation-state.

Refugee Resettlement
The first major trial for South Vietnamese nation-building was the influx of refugees that
were arriving from the North after the division of Vietnam in 1954. The exact number of
refugees that immigrated to the south varies depending on the source. This is due to the fact that
the headquarters of the South Vietnamese agency in charge of refugee resettlement was burned
down in 1955, resulting in many of the documents being destroyed.11 However, all sources agree
it was over 880,000.12 The vast majority of these refugees were Catholic. A 1955 report stated
that 76.3% were Catholic, 23.5% Buddhist, and 0.2% Protestant.13 A 1957 report makes a larger

11

Bui Van Luong, “Commentary on Bernard Fall,” In Viet-Nam: The First Five Years, edited by Richard W.
Lindholm (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1959), p. 60.
12
Bui Van Luong, “The Role of Friendly Nations,” In Viet-Nam: The First Five Years, p. 49; Peter Hansen, “Bắc Đi
Cú: Catholic Refugees from the North of Vietnam, and Their Role in the Southern Republic, 1954–1959,” Journal
of Vietnamese Studies 4, no. 3 (2009): pp. 173-211, DOI: 10.1525/vs.2009.4.3.173, p. 180; and Vietnam Task Force,
“Evolution of the War: Origins of the Insurgency,” In Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task
Force, Part 4, Chapter A-5 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 2011), https://naramedia-001.s3.amazonaws.com/arcmedia/research/pentagon-papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-IV-A-5.pdf, Tab 1, p. 9.
13
Peter Hansen, “Bắc Đi Cú: Catholic Refugees from the North of Vietnam,” p. 180
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claim of 85.8% Catholic and 14.4% Buddhist and Protestant.14
In any case, the large amount of Catholics would be very important for the Diem regime.
As the Pentagon Papers explain, the Catholics were “a politically malleable, culturally distinct
group, wholly distrustful of Ho Chi Minh and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, dependent
for subsistence on Diem’s government, and attracted to Diem as a co-religionist.”15 The doubling
of the Catholic population would thus effectively double his support and legitimacy among the
population. More importantly though was the fact that they could act “as a source of reliable
political and military cadres.”16 As a result, Catholics tended to be prioritized for advancement
and positions of importance.17
The influx of thousands of refugees also created new opportunities. Many of these
Catholic refugees would be put into the countryside in order to bolster rural communities’
connection with the government, not through economic or political benefits but through simple
demographics. A South Vietnam report in 1957 stated that, “settlers having experience in the
anti-Communist struggle will greatly contribute to an effective control system in these regions
and assure security in the village of the hinterlands.”18
Not all of the resettlement was about defeating the communists and extracting wealth
from the land however. Diem had a vision of Vietnam being made up of landholding middleclass farmers, similar to the American ideal of the “yeoman farmer”. This was combined with a
fear that Vietnamese cities were becoming too crowded. Such fears had existed in the past with
the French colonial government and there had even been plans under the French to develop the
14

Bui Van Luong, “The Role of Friendly Nations,” In Viet-Nam: The First Five Years, p. 49.
Vietnam Task Force, “Evolution of the War: Origins of the Insurgency,” p. 9.
16
Ibid.
17
Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York, NY: Random House,
1989), pp. 9, 71, 77, 137, 175-176, 181-182, 334, 508, 549, 748.
18
Gerald C. Hickey, Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands 1954-1976 (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 18.
15
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countryside, though this ultimately did not occur. The spreading of refugees throughout the
countryside would thus, in the eyes of the Diem government, provide several benefits.19

The Land Development Program
The resettlement program would transition into the Land Development Program in 1957.
Known in Vietnamese as Khu Dinh Dien (to nourish the fields), the program sought to move
people from the more populated coastal regions into the central highlands.20 The sites for
development were picked out personally by President Diem and would function as a “living
wall” that would protect against Communist incursion.21 The United States would contribute
more than $10 million to this project. Problems soon became apparent. The Americans viewed
the program as primarily economic. However President Diem viewed the program as primarily
about security. Thus, many of the sites were picked more for their military value rather than their
ability to sustain a population. For example, one village was built four kilometers from the
nearest water supply.22 Another was built in mountainous terrain that was unsuitable for
agriculture and over 87 miles from the nearest town, through roads that were impassable during
half the year.23
These problems would eventually lead to a suspension of funds for the program in late1957. A month later the suspension was lifted when the two countries agreed on a set of planning
procedures. Unfortunately, these procedures were never fully implemented in practice, causing
problems to continue. For example, Americans wanted 3 to 5 hectares for each family, but
19

Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2013), pp. 79 and 161.
20
Edward Miller, Misalliance, p. 171; and John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience
in Southeast Asia (New York, NY: Fredrick A. Praeger Publisher, 1963), p. 75.
21
Vietnam Task Force, “Evolution of the War: Origins of the Insurgency,” Tab. 2 p. 29.
22
John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia, p. 75.
23
Ibid.
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President Diem ordered just 1. When the Vietnamese refused to budge there was a discussion of
suspending funds again, but Washington ultimately ordered funding to continue.24 Funding was
again suspended in 1958 when the Agricultural Machinery Office, the agency responsible for
distributing and maintaining agricultural equipment, was shut down. Its responsibilities were
transferred to the GCLD, the Vietnamese agency created to oversee the Land Development
Program. Unfortunately, much of the expertise and infrastructure did not transfer, with around
half the employees being laid off. As a result, not only was equipment more likely to break due
to a lack of regular maintenance, but when it did break the machines took much longer to fix.
The suspension was lifted within a couple of months due to lobbying by the Vietnamese
government.25
Finally, in June 1958, funding was cut permanently due to the U.S. government learning
that Land Development funds were being used to build and maintain prison camps. A loophole
of sorts did appear though when the $5 million slated toward Land Development was instead
transferred toward military aid. This allowed the Vietnamese to simply transfer the new $5
million from their military to the Land Development Program.26 The program would continue for
a few more years and by 1961, over 210,000 people were relocated to 147 settlements.27 This
drastically changed the demographics of the Highlands. In 1954, 15% of the population in the
Central Highlands was ethnic Vietnamese. By the late 1960s, it was estimated to be over double
that at 37%.28 However, this did not necessarily translate to better security.

24

Ibid., p. 76.
Ibid., pp. 77-78.
26
Ibid., pp. 78-80.
27
Boon Hwee (Stan) Tan, “Dust Beneath the Mist: State and Frontier Formation in the Central Highlands of
Vietnam, the 1955-61 Period” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 2011), DOI: 10.25911/5d7a27dfaacf2, p.
211.
28
Ibid.
25
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The Central Highlands
As mentioned earlier, the Central Highlands was a particular focus of the Land
Development Program. Sparsely populated with dense jungles and hilly terrain, it was the perfect
environment for an insurgent group. The settlement of Vietnamese into the area would, however,
exacerbate relations with the native Highlanders. Highly ethnically diverse, the Highlands have
historically been independent from the rest of Vietnam and have fiercely defended this
independence.29 For their part, the Vietnamese viewed the Highlanders as inferiors, referring to
them as “Moi” (savages).30
The biggest issue that would continually plague relations was the issue of land. The
French had, for the most part, respected Highlander land claims, giving adequate compensation
or, for those tribes which did not typically sell land, bought 99 year leases. The French also had a
policy of not buying more than 30 hectares to prevent entire villages being taken by wealthy
foreigners. Gerald Hickey, the foremost American expert on Highlander issues, suggested a
similar policy in 1957; that Highlander land claims be acknowledged and that the government
work through the proper channels for each tribe.31 The South Vietnamese government, however,
took the opposite approach. The government had an official policy of viewing all Highlander
land as public and could thus be taken by the government with little to no compensation. When
General Le Van Kim, Director of the Land Development Program, was found to be fairly
compensating Highlanders with government funds he was promptly removed from his post.32

29

Gerald C. Hickey, The Highland People of South Vietnam: Social and Economic Development, RM-5281/1ARPA (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1967),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2005/RM5281.1.pdf, pp. 16-22; and Vietnamese
Affairs Staff, The Highlanders of South Vietnam: A Review of Political Developments and Forces (Washington, DC:
Central Intelligence Agency, 1966), p. 4.
30
Gerald C. Hickey, The Highland People of South Vietnam: Social and Economic Development, p. 28.
31
Ibid., pp. 77-92.
32
Gerald C. Hickey, Free in the Forest, pp. 44-45; and Gerald C. Hickey, The Highland People of South Vietnam:
Social and Economic Development, p. 76n13.
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Decrees in 1958 and 1959 stated that Highlanders “had a right only to the produce of the land
they were farming, not to the land itself.”33 The American advisory mission did not do much to
dissuade such actions. Wolf Ladejinsky, a senior American advisor to President Diem,
complained to Hickey that the Highlanders were being unreasonable, saying, "How do you
expect the government to deal with these children?”34
South Vietnam was also interested in “civilizing” the Highlanders; in this case
“civilizing” meaning to adopt Vietnamese culture and practices. The minorities in Vietnam were
viewed as a threat to national cohesion and stability. In the minds of the Vietnamese leadership,
the only way to ensure the Highlanders’ loyalty and identity to the state was to turn them
Vietnamese. This in effect meant the destruction of the Highlander way of life. Villages were
officially renamed using the Vietnamese language, Highlanders were forced to stop wearing their
traditional clothes, and all new houses were to be made in the Vietnamese style.35
This destruction of Highlander culture was combined with habitual Vietnamese
disrespect toward the native population. Vietnamese soldiers stole livestock and produce,
merchants swindled ignorant natives, and Vietnamese were given priority for positions in
government and schools.36 Such ill-treatment led to serious Highlander dissatisfaction. One is
quoted as saying, “The Vietnamese talk equality, but they don’t mean what they say. In their
hearts they want to dominate us. They are colonialists. The French were bad at the mouth, but in
their hearts they were good.”37 The fact that the French, who were entirely alien to the country
and which the Highlanders had revolted against in the early 1930s, were viewed in a more
positive light than the South Vietnamese government was disconcerting.
33

Gerald C. Hickey, The Highland People of South Vietnam: Social and Economic Development, p. 77.
Gerald C. Hickey, Free in the Forest, p. 44.
35
Ibid., pp. 5-8.
36
Ibid., pp. 50, 54-55.
37
Ibid., p. 44.
34
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The Viet Cong were quick to take advantage of this rising tension. Unlike the South,
North Vietnam had given their Highlanders a level of autonomy. This fact was frequently used in
propaganda, with the Viet Cong promising similar autonomy to the southern Highlanders.38 Such
propaganda was extremely attractive to the Highlanders, especially after the Bajaraka
Movement, a Highlander organization calling for autonomy, was suppressed by the government
in the late 1950s.39 By 1962, it was estimated that the government controlled only about 50% of
the Highlands. The situation was even worse in the very Northern provinces, where the estimate
was around 12%.40
It was at this point that the government would begin arming the Highlanders in what
would become known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). Led by the CIA using
U.S. Army Green Berets, Highlanders would be trained, given weapons, and sent to patrol their
local area. Of note for this paper is the use of civic action by the CIDG. Villages were taught
modern agriculture techniques, blacksmithing, and CIDG medics set up clinics providing basic
healthcare. Even after 1965 when the program became much more focused on offensive action,
the CIDG would be responsible for thousands of civic projects throughout the Highlands,
including 6.436 wells, 1,949 kilometers of road, and 110 hospitals.41 Such projects were the first
time this region had gained any benefit from the central government. Unfortunately, good-will
tended to be more towards the Americans, as the Vietnamese officials and soldiers that worked
alongside U.S. personnel tended to be “disappointingly indifferent”.42 In the official history of
the U.S. Army Special Forces in Vietnam, a 1963 report from Tay Ninh province is highlighted

38

Vietnamese Affairs Staff, The Highlanders of South Vietnam, p. 10.
Ibid., pp. 13-26.
40
Ibid., p. 32.
41
Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971, Vietnam Studies (Washington, DC: Government
Publishing Office, 1973), p. 155.
42
Ibid. p. 62.
39
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which states:
“Vietnamese military action in the province is almost non-existent... the refusal of
ARVN military personnel to cooperate and assist in these projects results in
failure to achieve the objectives of military civic action (goodwill leading to
support of GVN).
While a few isolated instances of military civic action have occurred, the
prevailing attitude among military personnel is that manual labor which assists
civilians is beneath a soldier's dignity. The degree of indifference of the military
toward civilian welfare was exemplified when the Vietnamese soldiers refused to
help unload USO emergency food supplies for a hamlet destroyed by the Viet
Cong. The arrogant, inconsiderate treatment of civilians by soldiers has caused
many civilians to support the Viet Cong.”43
The Vietnamese had a very different idea of how of how to deal with the Highlanders. In
March 1964, in a meeting between ARVN and Highlander leaders, one of the Vietnamese
officers stated, “I feel we can solve the Highlander problem the same way the Americans solved
their Indian problem. We should form Highlander reservations the same way the Americans
formed Indian reservations.”44 The suggestion did not go over well with either the Highlanders
or the Americans.
Continued ill-treatment would ultimately result in a revolt by the Highlanders in
September 1964. Lasting two days, two thousand highlanders would kill 73 Vietnamese and take
another 61 hostage. No Americans were harmed and the suppression of the revolt was led by
Americans, who were ultimately able to stop the revolt with no bloodshed.45 When the
government reigned on promises made after the revolt, another would occur a year later in
December 1965, though would be less successful due to advanced warning.46 Both revolts would
be instigated by the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (FULRO), a Highland
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autonomy organization.
These revolts did cause some improvements, as the government sought to avoid any
further conflict. After the 1964 revolt, more Highlanders were put into administrative positions
and selected for officer training.47 In 1966, members of FULRO were allowed to run elections
for the Constitutional Assembly.48 In 1967 the government finally recognized Highlander land
claims. Farm productivity was increased through modern agricultural techniques and it was
becoming increasingly common to see modern amenities such as motorbikes and electronics.49
However, such improvements were often a case of two steps forward, one step back.
While the government did officially recognize Highlander land claims, few actual titles had been
given out to legitimize these claims. During 1971 and 1972, there was a surge of Vietnamese
developing on Highlander land.50 Many of these Vietnamese were ARVN officers who saw such
land as an unofficial retirement benefit. When an officer was asked by Gerald Hickey if he
planned to pay for the land, “he just laughed.”51 Part of the problem with the lack of enforcement
was that, just as in the early sixties, the majority of government positions were held by ethnic
Vietnamese, with Pleiku being the sole province with a native Highlander provincial chief.52
The Vietnamese would also become increasingly suspicious of American motives. Some
Vietnamese leaders believed the U.S. had encouraged the Highlanders to revolt, had intentionally
trained and armed them to do so, and were attempting to create a third faction in the region
directly under American control.53 This mistrust caused any advice Americans gave about the
Highlands to be viewed with suspicion. In the summer of 1965 for example, Americans were not
47
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invited to be present during negotiations between the government and FULRO leaders.54 That
same year, an American and Australian official were asked to be reassigned from the region for
their perceived closeness to FULRO leaders.55
Part of this mistrust was due to the fact that the Highlanders did indeed believe that the
Americans were taking the place of the French and would protect their autonomy.56 This caused
the Highlanders to readily accept the American presence while resisting the Vietnamese. The
Americans also tended to be personally friendly with the Highlanders. Their foreignness,
ironically, made them much better at befriending Highlander natives, as they did not come with
any preconceived notions. All of this alienated the Vietnamese, who saw American-Highlander
relations as undermining their attempts to assimilate the population.
By the time of American withdrawal from Vietnam, the central government still had little
control over the region, especially in the border provinces of Pleiku and Kontum. In 1972,
around 48% of the hamlets in Pleiku and 56% of Kontum were marked as having low security by
the Hamlet Evaluation System.57 In a January 1972 report, just a few months before the 1972
Spring Offensive, the CIA would issue a report about a worrying buildup of forces in the
Highlands, saying, “If the Communists do decide to make a major military effort…they may
estimate that the balance of forces will be more favorable to them in the highlands than anywhere
else.”58 This assessment would ultimately prove true, as the Highlands were a major launching
point for both the 1972 and 1975 offensives.
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Population Control
In the summer of 1959, President Diem announced another settlement program, known as
the Agroville program in English and “khu tru mat” (dense and prosperous areas) in
Vietnamese.59 The Strategic Hamlet Program, begun in March 1962, was largely an expansion of
the Agroville concept with the same objectives. Unlike the Land Development Program where
the main goal was to improve security by changing the ethnic geography, the Agrovilles and later
Strategic Hamlet Program would seek to improve security by centralizing widely dispersed
villages into one fortified location. These new living centers would be located “beside major
roads and arteries of communication along which the security forces could more easily move to
provide protection and surveillance.”60 In addition, this centralization would also make civic
action much easier. With one central location, all the needs of the local community could be met
within one hamlet. Due to the similarities between the two programs and the fact that many of
the problems with the Agrovilles would continue with the Strategic Hamlets, this section will be
more about the overall concept of controlling the population in Vietnam rather than the specific
programs.
Unlike the Land Development Program, where families were enticed to move because of
the promise of free land and government subsidies, those involved in population control did not
move voluntarily. Although there was technically a process whereby villagers would volunteer to
be in the hamlets, in reality everyone in the designated area would be moved.61 In the hamlet of
Ben Tuong, for example, only 70 of the 205 families volunteered for resettlement.62 In the
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Agroville of Tan Luoc, only the two nearest villages to the construction site had families that
volunteered for resettlement.63 In one case, after a man refused to move his family, his wife was
kidnapped by the national police and would not be released until he agreed to the move.64
Compensation for relocation was insufficient at best. Peasants were compensated to
relocate, but their old homes were often valued at over ten times the amount paid by the
government.65 Payment could also be delayed for months and when it did arrive, a large portion
of the funds were stolen by province officials. In some cases peasants receive no money at all. 66
In addition, new hamlets were often built some distance away from villagers’ previous homes.
This meant that villagers had to walk up to 5 kilometers away to work their fields.67
The government worsened the situation by not only forcing villagers to relocate, but also
requiring them to build the hamlets without pay. Such forced labor was, as can be expected,
reported to be extremely unpopular among the peasantry. Government supporters would point
out that forced labor had been used extensively in the past by the French. However, as a report
produced for USAID would argue, “True, the French colonial regime regularly employed this
technique, but an independent nationalist government does not win the support of its population
by adopting the colonial method.”68 In the limited cases when compensation was provided,
payment could be delayed for months.69

National Archives and Records Administration, 2011), http://media.nara.gov/research/pentagon-papers/PentagonPapers-Part-IV-B-2.pdf, p. 22.
63
Joseph Zasloff, Rural Resettlement in Vietnam, p. 23.
64
Ibid., p. 25.
65
Pham Chung, Analysis of the Long-range Military, Economic, Political, and Social Effects of the Strategic Hamlet
Program in Viet Nam, (Washington, DC: Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1964), p. 204.
66
William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Viet Nam: 1962-1965 (Washington, DC: Advanced Research
Projects Agency, 1966), http://www.vrenken.com/coin/Nighswonger%20%281966%29%20%20Rural%20Pacification%20in%20Vietnam%201962-1965.pdf, p. 129.
67
Pham Chung, Analysis of the Long-range Military, Economic, Political, and Social Effects of the Strategic Hamlet
Program in Viet Nam, p. 206; William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Viet Nam: 1962-1965, p. 171; and
Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, p. 311.
68
Joseph Zasloff, Rural Resettlement in Vietnam, p. 25.
69
William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Viet Nam: 1962-1965, p. 134.

18

It might be argued that the lack of payment was due to necessity; that a third-world
country like South Vietnam did not have the resources to pay for such compensation. This
would, in fact, be one of the excuses South Vietnam would make for their lack of
compensation.70 However, population control was heavily subsidized by the U.S. and its allies.
The Strategic Hamlet Program alone cost over 1.4 billion piasters (the South Vietnamese
currency).71 This would equate to over $17 million in 1962 or $153 million in 2019.72 Of that,
nearly 70% was provided by the U.S. and its allies.73 This also does not include the construction
materials and military equipment that was freely given to the South Vietnamese government. The
problem was less about funding and more Diem’s view of the people’s relationship to the
government. In his view, it was the personal responsibility of the people to hard work towards
improving the entire community. Since the government guided the community, peasants should
be motivated to work due to that personal responsibility, not for monetary payment.74
Lack of planning and poor decision making would be one such example of the improper
use of U.S. funds. Province officials, feeling pressured to produce results in a short amount of
time, would create what American advisors would term “paper hamlets”.75 These hamlets would
be reported completed, but had no trained militia to man the defenses, no social services, and the
quality of the homes and defenses built were suspect.76 One of the major goals of U.S. advisors
throughout the early 1960s would be, “to convince GVN to proceed at a more measured,
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coherent pace with a qualitative improvement in the physical construction of strategic
hamlets.”77 Sir Robert Thompson, a British counterinsurgency advisor to President Diem, had
originally envisioned the construction of Strategic Hamlets as part of an “oil-spot” strategy,
where the government would gradually expand outward from already secure areas.78 Combined
with the social services that the hamlets would provide, population control was meant to solve
both the military and political problems of insurgency. Instead, the South Vietnamese started
construction of all hamlets around the country at the same time. This meant that some of the
hamlets were constructed in areas dominated by the Viet Cong which, as can be expected, led to
hamlets becoming fortresses of the Viet Cong rather than of the government.79
Corruption would also cripple the program. Construction materials were embezzled, with
province chiefs charging peasants for materials which had been provided for free by the United
States.80 Economic projects meant to better the lives of those within the hamlets were rarely
implemented outside of “show-case” hamlets near provincial capitals, with officials simply
pocketing the unused funds. The numbers of government cadres were much larger in official
documents than in reality, likely due to officials pocketing the unused salaries in a situation
similar to the “ghost soldiers” of the ARVN.81 In summary, if something could be stolen, it
probably was.
Population control did have some success. In 1962, trained government cadres taught
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more than 16,000 farmers modern farming techniques to improve agricultural production.82 To
support this, trees to enhance the fertility of the soil, pesticides, fertilizer, and new high
productivity seed strains were all delivered to enhance the potential of peasants’ fields. The seeds
turned out to be so successful that the Viet Cong gave orders to specifically allow trucks carrying
the fertilizer to pass unmolested, as the increased crop yield meant more food for the VC. 83
Hamlets, using the funds allocated for development projects, built roads, bridges, schools, dams,
canals, and in some cases even power plants, bringing electricity to the countryside for the first
time.84 From July 1962 to April 1963, enemy defections and government control increased, with
Viet Cong attacks decreasing.85 Hamlets which had successfully melded security with social
services were strongholds of government influence and were examples of what such a program
can achieve.
Unfortunately, such successes were not the norm. Many officials did not fully understand
the nature of the Agroville and Strategic Hamlet concept of mixing security with social and
economic improvement. Thus, many officials simply put up bamboo fences and forced the
peasants to move in, without telling the peasants why they were being relocated and what
benefits the hamlets would bring.86 If South Vietnam had followed the counsel of its American
advisers, the government might have been able to better regulate standards as well as educate
officials on what the purpose of the hamlets were for.
Reporting methodology for estimated government control was also criticized for being
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inaccurate, due to local officials not wanting to report bad results. This problem was combined
with the fact that some U.S. officials were not always willing to accept bad results. General
Harkins reportedly refused to accept reports on government control in the northern Mekong
Delta during this time as it showed “too much red”. Maps sent to Washington were “corrected”
to show more government control than Americans on the ground actually believed was the
case.87
The Pentagon Papers would summarize the Strategic Hamlet Program as being, “similar
if not identical to earlier population resettlement and control efforts practiced by the French and
by Diem. The long history of these efforts was marked by consistency in results as well as in
techniques: all failed dismally because they ran into resentment if not active resistance on the
part of the peasants at whose control and safety, then loyalty, they were aimed.”88 The authors of
the report would conclude that population control was “doomed by poor execution and by the
inability of the Ngo family to reform coupled with the inability of the U.S. to induce them to
reform.”89 Like many nation-building projects in Vietnam, the failures of population control
were more due to the government in charge of implementing it, rather than the strategy itself. In
the years to come, many of these hamlets would be torn down with the peasants returning to their
old homes, which they had never wanted to leave in the first place. Population control would be
largely discarded, and instead aid would be delivered in a more conventional manner.

Land Reform
Land reform was an issue that had been identified very early in the war by both the
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Vietnamese and American leadership. As stated earlier, Ngo Dinh Diem had a vision of a new
middle-class, land-holding peasantry. However, while Diem was cognizant of the peasant’s
plight, he did not want to anger his existing middle-class.90 As such, his 1956 land reform
program, Ordinance 57, was considered “modest in scope.”91 The first problem was that
agricultural land was limited to 100 hectares. Compare this to Japan’s 1946 land reform program
where all land worked by tenants in excess of 1 hectare and owner-cultivated land in excess of 3
hectares were subject to a forced government buyout.92 Taiwan’s 1953 program had a similar
limit of 3 hectares for all landowners.93 The 100 hectare limit, while far too high to completely
solve the problem of tenant farmers, would free up roughly 20% of arable land. In reality though,
only half of this was actually sold to former tenant farmers, as owners split up their holdings
among family members to get around the law. Most of the land that was sold was to northern
refugees and Catholics who, as discussed in the section on refugees, were already more likely to
support the government. Tenant rents were fixed at 15 to 25% and farmers were guaranteed the
right to farm rented land for at least 3 years.94 However, these rent reductions, like the land
redistribution, had mixed success with some land owners still forcing tenants to pay higher rents.
Land continued to be a problem for several years, as the political instability after President
Diem’s death in 1963 would cause any more reform efforts to flounder.
The year 1967 would bring several advances for land reform. One was the election of
Ngyuen Van Thieu as President of South Vietnam. Thieu was much more sympathetic to the
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plight of Vietnamese peasants, having grown up on a small rice farm.95 The United States also
began to perceive land reform as more important. Personnel were sent to study the possibility for
a new land reform bill, embassy staff was replaced with people who had previously advocated
for land reform, and Congress began to criticize the President’s performance on promoting
reform in Vietnam.96 This support among both America’s and Vietnam’s leaders with lead to a
1970 land-to-the-tiller law, which would expropriate all land not directly cultivated by the owner
and limit all agricultural land to 15 hectares. The land would be paid for by the government and
given to the peasants for free. The United States would help by paying 10% of the cost to
compensate landowners.97 Combined with the earlier Ordinance 57 law, the 1970 land-to-thetiller would decrease land tenancy from around 75% farmers in 1955 to 20% in 1975.98
The distribution of land to farmers would bring immediate benefits for the Vietnamese
peasantry. Since farmers no longer had to give over a quarter of their crop as payment, peasants
now had, on average, 27% more income.99 Land ownership also meant that whatever crops a
farmer was losing was due to Viet Cong taxation, not landowners identified with the
government. A survey conducted by the Control Data Corporation and funded by USAID, found
that “the Land to the Tillers Law was mentioned by 68 percent of the people as a major reason
for improvement in their village life.”100 The survey also stated, “The reform seems to be a major
causal factor creating political support for and identification with the national government.”101
Yet what is notable is that the survey takers were disguised as French, with one recounting, “I
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met one tough-looking little Vietnamese in a remote village, and noticed a look of relief on his
face when I started talking French. I think he was relieved when he decided I was a Frenchman
and he wasn't going to have to shoot me.”102 This encounter shows that land reform was not a
cure-all solution that immediately brought rural peasants to the government’s side.

Conclusion
The question though is: did nation-building have a positive effect on the war? The best
metric we have to determine this is the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), which measures
security and socio-economic conditions in hamlets throughout the country. By November 1972,
the Hamlet Evaluation System showed that 78% of Vietnam’s hamlets, representing 90.1% of
the population, were relatively secured by the government. This is a definite improvement over
1964 when only 40% of the population was under government control or in 1967 when 62.1%
was under government control. The government seemed to be making progress in winning over
the people, if at a slow and often stumbling pace.103 Yet it is also important to note that HES data
correlates heavily with population.104 As one goes further out from the cities, one finds the
villages less and less safe. Considering that guerilla forces are able to operate best in the
peripheries of a country, nation-building seems to have had a mixed result. It did extend the
reach and influence of the central government, but not entirely. There were still portions of the
countryside that were outside the government’s control.
By 1972 though, the war had fundamentally changed. It had become much more
conventional and much more Northern dominated. Thus, to a certain extent, the success of
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nation-building would not matter. Public support would do little good against large conventional
offensives in 1968, 1972, and 1975. The fact that the insurgency would come to be dominated by
Northern recruits would also lessen the importance of control over the population, as the South
was no longer the insurgency’s primary recruitment base.105 Combined with America’s waning
support and ultimate withdrawal, one can see that whatever advantages South Vietnam gained
were countered by the North’s increasingly conventional capabilities. Perhaps if 78% of hamlets
were under government control in 1962 instead of 1972, nation-building might have made a
difference. As it was, nation-building’s successes proved to have come too late to be of use.
Between 1955 and 1975, the United States would give a total of $8.5 billion of economic
assistance to South Vietnam, which would equate to around $64 billion in 2019.106 Of that
assistance, 45% (over $3.8 billion) was provided before the 1968 Tet Offensive. During this
period, U.S. non-military aid would be valued at upwards of 35% of South Vietnam’s gross
national product (GNP).107 Such massive amounts of aid would, in theory, give the United States
an incredible amount of influence over the Vietnamese government. Yet despite North
Vietnam’s rhetoric of South Vietnam being a “puppet” of the United States, America gave little
pressure on the South Vietnamese government to reform.108 Despite ignoring advice given by the
U.S. on how to conduct the Land Development and Strategic Hamlet Programs, the U.S.
continued to fund these projects, even when it was clear to American observers on the ground
that there were serious flaws.
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The best description for America’s reluctance to use coercion would be Lyndon Johnson
in his book on his years as President. In a meeting on November 22, 1963, President Johnson
told his advisors that,
“I thought we had spent too much time and energy to shape other countries in our
own image…the main objective at present was to help them resist those using
force against them. As for nation-building, I said that I thought the Vietnamese,
Thai, and other peoples of Asia knew far better than we did what sort of nations
they wanted to build. We should not be too critical if they did not become
thriving, modern, twentieth-century democracies in a week."109
With nation-building in Vietnam, American leaders had largely worked on the principle
that it is better that the Vietnamese do it tolerably than Americans do it perfectly. The problem
was that the Vietnamese were not performing nation-building tolerably. They were performing it
poorly and slowly; a bad combination that even a large American military presence could not fix.
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EL SALVADOR

The El Salvador Civil War lasted from 1979 to 1992. The main objective of the rebel
forces was to topple the oligarchic system of government that facilitated economic inequality. As
will be described in more detail, this system was led by the agricultural elite who owned most of
the land and the military, who used force to keep the oligarchy in place. The United States would
attempt to break this oligarchy and satisfy the moderates among the opposition by promoting
democracy, human rights, and land reform. In the end, America’s efforts would only have
limited success.

Background
El Salvador’s Civil War cannot be explained without first a summary of El Salvador’s
war with Honduras in 1969. For years, Salvadorans had immigrated to Honduras, often illegally,
to find work. In the late 1960s, Honduras would increasingly see these immigrants as the source
of economic troubles and, in 1969, would use an old land reform bill to take farmland held by
Salvadorans. Thousands of Salvadorans were thus forced off their land, sometimes violently.
This caused outrage among the public in El Salvador and in July of 1969 El Salvador invaded
Honduras. While El Salvador won, it would be a hollow victory.110
Honduras subsequently cut off all trade and immigration between the two countries. This
caused a crisis for El Salvador. Overpopulation and the lack of jobs had been the reasons why
Salvadorans had originally moved to Honduras. The estimated 130,000 Salvadorans that had
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returned thus put a serious strain on the country’s economy. The Christian Democrats (PDC), the
most powerful of the opposition parties, pushed for land reform to help alleviate the problem.
The argument being that by breaking up the large landholdings, there would be more farms and
thus more jobs. While the idea was widely popular, it was seen as a threat to the elite families
that acted as an oligarchy for the country. In the 1972 election, the PDC presidential candidate
lost in what was considered by many to be a fraudulent election. In response, some young
officers of the army attempted a coup, but did not get the support of the wider military and failed.
The years after the coup would be a period of increasing violence. The people, led by left-wing
organizations, would call for reform. The government, unable to bring about reforms due to
pressure from the right, would respond to criticism and protests with violence. This violence
would cause the left to become more militant, leading to attacks against the government, who
would inevitably respond with more violence.111
The U.S. would have little involvement in the conflict during its early stages. Between
1970 and 1979, the amount of aid (military and economic) the U.S. gave to El Salvador would
total just $7 million.112 In 1977, El Salvador would refuse further U.S. aid due to President
Carter’s insistence that countries improve their human rights record in order to receive American
funds.113 Although the Carter administration would encourage El Salvador to reform and stop its
strategy of unrestricted violence, the administration would have no leverage to persuade the
Salvadoran government.
The turning point would be in 1979 with two events. The first would be in July when the
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Sandinistas, a Marxist rebel group, overthrew the U.S.-backed Nicaraguan government. This
would bring about fears of Marxist groups being successful in other parts of the Americas,
including El Salvador. These fears would only grow as less than a year later the various
Salvadoran rebel groups consolidated into the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
(FMLN).114 The second event would be a coup by junior military officers in 1979. This new
government was seriously interested in reform and creating a better country for the lower classes.
With a government now in power that it could be seen working with, the Carter administration
offered $5.7 million in military aid, beginning America’s involvement in El Salvador’s Civil
War.115

Violence and Human Rights
Human rights violations and war crimes would be a continual issue with the Salvadoran
military. This was due to the fact that violence had always been used as a way to put down
rebellions in the past, the most notable being the 1932 revolt in which an estimated 30,000
peasants were killed.116 In 1977, state-sponsored militias, targeting church leaders who
advocated for political reform, distributed leaflets saying, "Be a Patriot! Kill a Priest!"117 As U.S.
involvement grew from 1979 onwards, the goal of American officials was to create security
institutions that respected human rights and could thereby gain the support of the people it was
supposed to serve.
America’s main tool for achieving this goal was the threat of suspending aid. However,
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El Salvador often failed to fully enact the reforms desired and aid would need to be continued for
the war effort despite only partial fulfillment of objectives. In October, 1980, the U.S.
government demanded a series of human rights reforms in exchange for the leasing of six
helicopters, including the transfer of officers involved in death squads. Instead, America settled
on a new code of conduct for the Salvadoran military; a code of conduct which would be useless
unless actually enforced.118 In December 1980, four American nuns were raped and killed by the
Salvadoran National Guard. In response, America suspended aid. In return for the resumption of
aid the government had to install Jose Duarte, the Christian Democrat who lost the 1972 election,
as president and kick several right-wing officers out of senior military position. After these
concessions, economic aid was resumed 12 days later.119
From 1980-1982, the security forces would systematically hunt down leftist forces, with
little regard to whether the person being killed was civilian or combatant. This would result in
the destruction of entire villages, killing hundreds of civilians that may or may not have actively
supported the insurgency.120 Although the vast majority of the violence was located in the
countryside, the government’s dominance in the cities would largely destroy the FMLN’s
presence in the urban centers.121 Of particular note is the targeting of the Revolutionary
Democratic Front (FDR), the political wing of the FMLN.122 The killing of several of the FDR’s
leaders in November 1980 by right-wing death squads not only would hamper efforts for an early
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negotiated settlement but also showed the mentality of the military.123 Pinned on one of the
bodies was a note declaring, "Long live El Salvador! Long live the massacre of 1932!"124
The killings would also weaken the Christian Democrat’s political infrastructure, hurting
their ability to organize voters against right-wing parties.125 In 1980 alone, 64 Christian
Democrat leaders were killed.126 The right was further strengthened in May 1980 when, after a
fierce standoff between conservative and reformist military officers, many reformists were
transferred to non-combat positions. Thus, any officers that might moderate human rights
offenses were sidelined to positions where they would have little impact on the conduct of the
war.127
In December 1983, Vice President Bush would visit El Salvador to deliver a list of
demands. Several military officers known to be involved in death squads had to be relieved of
command, trials held for murdered Americans, and the military had to publically condemn death
squads.128 CIA Director William Casey would arrive soon after; again threatening aid if the
country did not curb the death squads. This would in fact have an effect. Most estimates show a
decrease in extra-judicial killings after 1983.129 However, while the killings decreased, they
never actually stopped. The biggest evidence that the security forces had not fundamentally
changed was during the 1989 FMLN offensive. The military used indiscriminate air strikes when
attacking insurgent forces in civilian areas and, even before the battle was over, security forces

123

Richard A. Haggerty, ed. El Salvador: A Country Study, p. 40; and William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard,
p. 59.
124
William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, p. 59.
125
Ibid., p. 50.
126
William Stanley, Protection Racket State, p. 184.
127
Ibid., pp. 207-208 and 224.
128
Ibid., p. 229.
129
Jule Krüger, Patrick Ball, Megan E. Price, and Amelia Hoover Green, “It Doesn’t Add Up: Methodological and
Policy Implications of Conflicting Casualty Data,” In Counting Civilian Casualties: An Introduction to Recording
and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict, edited by Taylor B. Seybolt, Jay D. Aronson, and Baruch Fischhoff,
pp. 247-264 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 256-258, Figure 12.2.

32

began a campaign of retaliation against anyone it perceived to have leftist leanings.130 This
included several Jesuit priests at Central American University, which was perceived by the
military to be a source of subversive thinking.131
The UN Truth Commission, created in 1992 to investigate war crimes, documented
22,000 “serious acts of violence” from January 1980 to July 1991. Of these: 60% were
extrajudicial killings, 25% were disappearances, and 20% torture (figures add up to over 100%
due to overlapping complaints). 85% of these acts of violence were attributed to the government
or its state-sponsored death squads. The vast majority occurred during the early years of the war,
with 50% of the violence taking place in the first two years.132
Overall, reforms for human rights were largely a façade. While the U.S. could make the
security forces decrease their killings, it could not fundamentally change how these forces dealt
with the opposition. The government’s response to the 1989 offensive is indicative of the
fundamental problem with Salvadoran security forces. Whether it be the military, National
Guard, intelligence agencies, or police forces, all had a history of violent repression and would
continue to use such violent methods when deemed necessary.

Political System
Historically, the large land-holders of El Salvador and the security forces have had a
symbiotic relationship where the elite would be protected from the peasants and reformists, and
in exchange the security services would receive money and power.133 This would be derisively
referred to by William Stanley as a “protection racket state”. This term, while perhaps
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inflammatory, is accurate. The National Guard was especially notorious for being little more
than the elite’s private bodyguard, with National Guard stations located on large estates and
Guardsmen given supplemental pay by landowners.134 The military, though, was the security
branch that held the power. Every President from 1931 to 1982 was a military officer, and the
graduating class from El Salvador’s military academy could expect to eventually occupy the top
positions of power.135 A continual goal of the United States was to change this political system to
be more democratic, and thus win over a population that had shown increasing frustration with
military rule.
As stated earlier, the United States’ cooperation with El Salvador would really begin in
1979 with a coup instigated by reformist military officers. The United States had in fact known
of the coup beforehand, as some of the conspirators had come to the embassy hoping for U.S.
assistance once a new government was established.136 The U.S. viewed a new government that
was more progressive and not tainted by human rights abuses as a much better partner for future
cooperation, with an internal memo stating, “a successful coup carried out by the
moderates…offers the cleanest solution to our policy dilemmas”.137
The new government was led by two colonels and three civilians, with a cabinet
composed of civilians.138 Immediately after the coup, political prisoners were released and
elections were promised.139 This change in government and the initial steps they had taken
convinced the left to give the new government a chance and a 30-day truce was declared for the
month of November. However, the junta was unable to bring about the major changes that the
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left wanted. Even before the end of the truce, the rebel groups had given up on the new
government and resumed attacks.140
The blocking of major reforms would produce a showdown between the military and
civilian leaders on December 27, 1979. The civilians had threatened to resign if reforms, such as
land redistribution, were not enacted. They also demanded that Defense Minister Guillermo
García step down. In response, National Guard Director Colonel Vides Casanova stated bluntly,
“Colonel García is the man from whom we take orders, not the junta. We have put you into the
position where you are, and for the things that are needed here, we don't need you. We have been
running the country for 50 years, and we are quite prepared to keep on running it.”141 By January
4th, most of the cabinet members and all three civilian members of the junta resigned.142 The
United States did not view this as particularly alarming. The civilian leaders of the junta were
viewed as too far to the left, with several officials having ties to El Salvador’s Communist
party.143 Even before the junta’s collapse, America would be looking for a more moderate set of
leaders that it could support.
A new junta would be created on January 10, 1980. The three new civilian leaders would
come from the Christian Democratic Party, the same party that had lost the fraudulent election of
1972. The U.S. played a large part in the establishment of the second junta, with the U.S.
embassy facilitating meetings between the PDC and military leadership. United States officials
also made it clear to the military that any future aid would depend on cooperation with the
Christian Democrats, which the U.S. viewed as more moderate than the previous junta.144 This
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new junta was actually seen by the right as more dangerous than the first precisely because it was
more moderate, and thus had the potential for greater international support. A preliminary
agreement between the military and PDC to institute land reform also contributed to a sense that
this government was a real threat to the elite’s power.145 A coup was planned for February, but
the United States soon got wind of the plot and threatened to retract aid.146 As a result, the coup
was abandoned. Yet ironically, this crisis was in part American-made. American military and
intelligence personnel had friendly relations with right-wing security officials, with some
advocating to Washington the benefits of a right-wing government.147 Ambassador White, in a
cable to Washington in March 1980, complained:
“This is unquestionably the most undisciplined diplomatic mission I have ever
seen and a good share of our problems in El Salvador arise directly out of the
mixed signals we have been sending to the various political actors here, especially
to the armed forces…It would help if Washington agencies, specifically CIA and
DIA, gave clearest and most forceful instructions to their representatives that U.S.
policy does not countenance a rightwing solution and that every opportunity must
be sought to denounce rightwing violence that threatens to radicalize the country
irretrievably.”148
Statements made by Republicans during the presidential campaign also convinced some
Salvadoran conservatives that a large portion of the United States did not care about democracy
or human rights. Reagan himself said in a 1980 press conference that, "I don't think that you can
turn away from some country because here and there they do not totally agree with our
conception of human rights."149
To counter the right’s power, Ambassador White began to meet with Colonel Majano, a
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member of the junta, to discuss ways to increase the power of the military’s reformist faction.
The right-wing elements of the security forces, however, were aware of the embassy’s talks with
Majano and tried to have him assassinated in early April. On May 9, 1980, a rightist coup plot
led by Roberto D'Aubuisson, a known death squad commander, was discovered.150 The
conspirators were quickly arrested but an intense standoff developed, with several conservative
brigades threatening to invade the capital city of San Salvador if the coup plotters were not
released. The reformists threatened back that if anybody entered the city the prisoners would be
killed.
Some of the reformists urged Majano to enact their own coup and remove those in the
military’s high command. However, while some in the reformist faction were eager to destroy
the existing military system, Majano and other more moderate reformists were less eager. The
prisoners were released and, in a vote of all the officers in the military, Majano was stripped of
his title as Commander-in-Chief. The United States, which had previously fought for a more
reform-minded military, ultimately decided not to get involved. Pressuring El Salvador to
imprison or remove officers involved in the coup attempt might have worked, but it would also
have likely led to more infighting and instability within the military. The United States
determined that a stable military was needed for El Salvador to fight the insurgency, even if that
same military was repressive and anti-reform.151
Many reformist officers would be transferred to non-combat positions in September.
After the transfers, the rest of the officers still in combat positions were threatened by
assassinations which only strengthened the insurgency as former military officers joined rebel
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groups for safety.152 In early December Majano was forced off the junta by the military, ending
what little influence the reformist faction had left.153 As discussed earlier, the killing of the
American nuns in December 1980 would cause aid to be suspended and only reinstated when the
military agreed to transfer some conservative military officers out of command positions and
make Duarte president, though this did little to change the fundamental problems with El
Salvador’s political system.154
The 1982 election was considered by the United States to be crucial to El Salvador’s
legitimacy. It was also vital to El Salvador’s future aid. Many in Congress were skeptical of
America’s participation in the country and were worried that the increasing American
involvement might turn the conflict into another Vietnam. The holding of fair elections would
indicate both El Salvador’s progress on democratization and the quality of its security forces by
protecting election centers. While the election was not a blatant power-grab as the 1972 election,
it did show the continued power of El Salvador’s right. The right-wing had created a new
political party called Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) with Roberto D'Aubuisson as its
presidential candidate. Due to the assassination of PDC officials, intimidation in the countryside,
and ARENA simply being backed by the rich elite, the right would have a significant advantage
in the 1982 election.155
Yet despite these advantages, the Christian Democrats would win a plurality of seats in
the National Assembly, El Salvador’s unicameral legislature. However, when the military’s own
political party, the National Conciliation Party (PCN), combined their votes with ARENA, the
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right-wing had the majority and could make Roberto D'Aubuisson president, as the 1982 election
process had the president elected by the Assembly.156 This worried U.S. officials who worried
that a right-wing government with a known death squad commander as its president would cause
Congress to cut off aid.
There then began an effort by the United States to convince the right not to elect
D'Aubuisson as president. This was hampered by the fact that much of the landholding elite did
not believe the U.S. would ever cut off aid, especially during the Reagan administration.
Salvadoran elites had in fact celebrated Reagan’s victory on election night, believing his fervent
anti-communism would allow them relatively free reign. As one supporter of D'Aubuisson
stated, “Reagan will never let the Communists win here. It's just a complete bluff.”157 In addition
to the Ambassador, the U.S. would send a congressional delegation led by the House majority
leader as well as General Vernon Walters to pressure ARENA not to elect D’Aubuisson.
This pressure was enough to convince the military to drop their support of D’Aubiosson.
Instead of siding with ARENA, the military’s National Conciliation Party combined their votes
with the Christian Democrats.158 Ultimately, Alvaro Magana, a businessman aligned with the
military, would be elected president. In the words of William LeoGrande, “The March 1982
balloting demonstrated that El Salvador could be forced to go through the motions of holding an
election, but its aftermath demonstrated with equal clarity that the election had not changed the
basic dynamics of Salvadoran politics. The army was still the ultimate power behind the
regime…”159
The 1984 election would, again, have ARENA nominate D'Aubuisson as its presidential
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candidate. The Christian Democrats meanwhile nominated Jose Napoleon Duarte and the PCN
Francisco Guerrero, one of the colonels who had served on the junta. Like the 1982 election, the
United States would covertly try to stop D'Aubuisson from coming to power. First by attempting
to persuade ARENA not to nominate him and then by having the CIA funnel $1.4 million to the
opposition parties. USAID would also give around $1 million to Salvadoran trade unions, most
of which supported Duarte. It was also helped that the Christian Democrats had been able to
build back their political infrastructure, allowing them to have a much more effective campaign.
Ultimately, Duarte would win with 53.6% of the vote in a runoff election.160
Yet despite a seemingly more free, if American-influenced, political process, the military
was still clearly in charge. Duarte’s effort to negotiate with the FMLN in 1984 failed partly due
to the fact that only the military could decide the terms of peace, not Duarte and the civilian
government.161 The U.S. did not help in these negotiations as there was still hope that El
Salvador could win militarily. Negotiations in 1989 would be stalled for months due to the
military’s opposition and a successful peace would only be achieved due to the military’s
acquiescence.162
This was the crux of the problem with reforming El Salvador’s political system.
Ultimately, it did not matter who won the elections. Whether ARENA or the Christian
Democrats were in power, neither party could make any decisions unless the military approved,
or at least did not actively oppose. No matter how fair elections were, it ultimately acted as a
façade. Thus, it is not surprising that the opening up of elections and competition between
political parties did not bring about a significant decrease in insurgent support. As long as the
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military maintained their independence, the government could not convince the insurgency that
there would be real, lasting reform. Salvadoran elections were, ironically, much more important
in deciding American opinion to continue the war than Salvadoran opinion to end it.
While the U.S. was unable to fundamentally change Salvadoran politics, its influence did
have some important effects. As can be seen with the choosing of the president in 1982, the
military had begun to deviate from the demands of the agricultural elite. With the United States
now their primary benefactor, the military could act more independently and decide on issues the
way they deemed fit, such as long-awaited land reform.

Land Reform
Arable land has historically been concentrated among the very rich of El Salvador, and
would only worsen as time went on. Due to the rise of export crops, the ability for large land
owners to get proportionally larger loans than small farmers, and legislation that favored large
landowners, the country’s farmland would be increasingly concentrated among the wealthy.163
William Durham estimated that the average land owned by a farmer went from 7.41 hectares in
1892 down to .38 hectares in 1971.164 By 1971, 8% of farms used 73% of the land.165
Landlessness (those who rented or did not have access to land) rose from 25.9% in 1971 to an
estimated 38% in 1980.166
The military was very aware of these facts and the implication that a peasant rebellion
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could erupt from such a situation. Throughout the 1970s, the military government would attempt
to pass a land reform bill to solve this issue. The first bill came in 1973, but failed due to lack of
support from the land-holding right and their conservative allies in the military.167 Another
attempt was made in 1976 that would mainly distribute government controlled land and what
privately controlled land taken would be compensated by money promised by USAID.168
However, this was seen as a dangerous precedent and never passed. The 1979 reformist
government would again attempt land reform, but would also meet resistance from the right. In a
meeting about reforming various aspects of the country the Defense Minister, part of the
conservative faction of the government, bluntly stated, "All of the shit that you have been
discussing is not going to happen. We are not going to permit it."169 Each time, agrarian reform
would fail due to lack of support from the only demographic that the military ultimately listened
to: the agrarian elite. While there was certainly a large faction within the military that wanted
land reform and to increase the quality of life for rural peasants, they simply did not have the
political power to enact such policies.
This would change in 1980 as the United States began to heavily invest in the country.
Combined with the increasing intensity of the insurgency, this gave the U.S. a much greater
position on which to pressure the Salvadoran government to enact agrarian reform. The result
would be a three-phased plan announced in March 1980. The first phase expropriated estates that
were over 1250 acres in size and converted them into cooperatives. These cooperatives would act
much like a corporation, with each farmer having an investment in the farm and pooling their
resources to better take advantage of the land. Phase I distributed around 14.7% of the country’s
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arable land.170 Unfortunately, this land was not always the best and more often than not was used
for cattle grazing.171 Phase II called for expropriating land between 250 and 1250 acres in size.
Constituting around 12% of the country’s arable land, it was also some of the country’s best,
producing 35% of El Salvador’s coffee, 40% of its cotton, and 20% of its sugar.172 Naturally, the
agricultural elite were heavily against this part of the reform plan and it was ultimately never
implemented. Phase III was not originally part of the plan but was written by the United States,
with El Salvador pressured to enact it. It would give all farm renters the right to own the land
they worked, up to 17 acres. This would affect 12.3% of the nation’s arable land and 100,000
families.173
Problems would rise up quickly, especially with Phase III. Many of those who gained
control of their rented land were not made aware of the change and thought they were still
renting.174 Around 25,000 of the 100,000 families slated to gain control of rented land were
forced off by their renters and because most rental agreements were verbal, there was no way for
the farmers to prove they had been working the land for years.175 In 1982, the legislature voted to
suspend Phase III for a year and add an amendment that excluded certain types of land from
being claimed. These actions caused Congress to cut $100 million in aid slated for the next year
and threatened to cut off all aid entirely if the land reforms were repealed. In response, the
Salvadoran military began to return evicted renters back to their land and the president vetoed
the suspension of Phase III.176
In 1983, a constitutional amendment was passed that limited individual land ownership to
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605 acres.177 Owners were given three years to sell their land and, in order to avoid land holders
from indirectly owning large estates, could not sell their land to family members. However, due
to the fact that the largest estates had been broken up in Phase I of the agrarian reform plan and
that land holders already had a tradition of dividing their assets between family members, this
only would affect around 3% of the country’s farms. By this point, El Salvador had reached the
point at what it could realistically afford. The country was already having trouble paying for
Phase I and III of the agrarian reform plan. Unlike Vietnam, the United States would not help
pay for the compensation of private land forcibly taken by the government.178 There was also the
fact that El Salvador was a small country that had a limited amount of land. There were already
problems in the implementation of Phase III where tenants had not been given enough land to
sustain themselves.179 Dividing the country up even further could cause more problems than it
solved.180 As a result, no other land reform would take place until the 1992 peace agreement
between the government and FMLN, which was largely just recognition of land divided up by
the FMLN.181
Unfortunately, land reform was not the solution it was hoped it would be. One big factor
was that the number of that farmers actually benefitted from the reforms was much lower than
anticipated. Even after the threat by Congress to retract aid, problems in implementation and
unlawful eviction would continue. A 1984 audit by USAID showed that a third of those affected
by Phase III were not benefitting due to threats or evictions.182 Others had to abandon land due to
the fighting between FMLN and government forces in the area. Farmers gaining new land were
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required to pay back the value of the land over a period 30 years.183 However, many found that
they could not keep up with the payments. This was especially true of Phase III as a sizeable
portion of the farmland that was given out was low-quality. Before, tenant farmers had practiced
crop rotation, renting different plots of land every year in order to keep the land fertile. However
Phase III only gave them the one plot of land they were currently working, which would quickly
become unusable after a few years of use.184 As a result, statistics on the number of people each
phase of reform affected have to be taken with a grain of salt. While land reform did affect a
large amount of the rural population, only a fraction actually benefitted.
There was also the fact that insurgent forces were creating their own cooperatives after
they drove landowners out of the area. By the end of the war the FMLN had control of 18.5% of
the nation’s farmland and had distributed it much as the government had.185 As a result, a peasant
was just as likely to gain land by supporting the insurgency as by supporting the government.
This obviously made the government’s reform efforts less incentivizing.
There is also the fact that, while land equality was a big factor for people supporting the
insurgency, it was not the only one. For her book Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El
Salvador, Elizabeth Jean Wood interviewed over 200 Salvadoran citizens, mainly in insurgent
controlled or contested territory. Through these interviews she found that land was only one
factor in a person’s willingness to support the insurgency. Those who supported the FMLN were
not just dissatisfied with the division of land, but also El Salvador’s larger political system. The
desire to gain revenge against government violence and for a greater political voice would be just
as important. Thus, it would be hard to persuade insurgents to put down their weapons when
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violent repression and military control continued. Especially when the FMLN was not only
delivering on the same type of land reform as the government, but also promising much more; a
more democratic and humanitarian El Salvador.

Conclusion
The war ended on January 16, 1992 with a peace agreement between the government and
FMLN. The ending of the war, though, was due less to American aid, and more to exhaustion.
The 1989 offensive, sometimes called “El Salvador’s Tet Offensive”, convinced both the
insurgents and the government that victory by either side was impossible, at least in the short
term.186 Despite receiving an estimated $4 billion in American aid and quadrupling the size of
the military, the government was not unable to make significant headway against the insurgency
militarily nor were they able to turn the hearts and minds of citizens who were supporting the
insurgency.187 The fact that the FMLN were able to move hundreds of fighters in the capital
without any of the residents notifying the government showed the lack of loyalty that people had
towards the government.188 The FMLN, for its part, did not have the manpower to do much other
than harass government forces and, like the government, had not gained the support of as many
civilians as it needed. Just like the government the 1989 offensive would be a wake-up call for
the FMLN, showing that the people were not as enthusiastic in their support as previously
thought.189 According to Elisabeth Wood, around two-thirds of Salvadorans she interviewed did
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not actively support the insurgency.190
The economic and political situation had also changed dramatically since the start of the
war. The agrarian elite were far less powerful. If they had not been driven off their land or forced
to pay taxes by the FMLN, they had lost many of their holdings to government land reform. The
decline in agriculture also meant that the industrial elite who resided in the cities gained more
political power. Never having to rely on the military’s protection racket to ensure their business
success meant that these industrial elites had always been more open to a negotiated solution
than the agrarian elites.191 The destruction of the agrarian elite’s power and the overall damage to
the economy meant that the military was far more reliant on U.S. aid than before. At the same
time, the United States was less interested in the war due to exasperation with the Salvadoran
military’s unwillingness to change. In 1990, Congress cut aid for 1991 by 50% and required the
government to negotiate with the FMLN in order to receive the rest of the aid.192
After over a decade of civil war, the United States would be unable to change the
underlying problems with El Salvador. The military, while allowing for free and fair elections,
never gave up power to the civilian governments that were elected. Violence continued to be a
problem and, as the 1989 offensive showed, was the default response to dealing with the
opposition. Agrarian reform could be considered America’s most successful achievement in the
country, but even this came with flaws and was ultimately overshadowed by other issues.
It is also hard to imagine the United States being much more successful than it was. If the
U.S. threatened the military’s place as the country’s center of power, this would in effect be the
same threat that the FMLN posed, just by different means. If forced to choose losing aid money
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or losing their power, the military might well have decided to take their chances with fighting the
FMLN. The security forces’ attacks on leftist groups in 1980-1982 destroyed the FMLN’s
infrastructure in the cities and the 1932 massacre showed that widespread killings in the
countryside could bring about an end to a revolution. Thus, the country might have seen much
more human rights abuses if the U.S. rescinded aid, as the only alternative the military had for
U.S. funds was overwhelming violence.
Overall, nation-building in El Salvador had limited success. It did help to moderate
behavior and decreased the power of the agricultural elite. Nation-building, combined with
military aid, likely limited the appeal of insurgent propaganda and helped to create the stalemate
that ultimately led to a negotiated peace. Ultimately though, it would be the sheer cost of the war
combined with outside states’ refusal to fund the parties involved that would actually end the
war.

48

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is the least developed country the United States has tried to exercise and
assist in nation-building. Unlike in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Iraq, Afghanistan had no central
government to rebuild. Decades of war and political infighting had destroyed any semblance of
effective government. Even when the Taliban controlled much of the country, government
services was nearly non-existent. While the Taliban could raise an army and provide law and
order, it could not provide education, public utilities, civilian jobs, or healthcare. This problem
was worsened by the Taliban restrictions, and eventual banishment, of international aid
organizations. The Taliban could hardly claim to even be Afghani. Many aspects of Afghan
culture, such as most of the arts and Nowruz (the Persian New Year), were banned for being unIslamic. The Taliban government was in many ways more an occupying army than an actual
government.193
Yet this chaos also provided some benefits. In large part, the United States simply had to
create a stable government that would keep the peace and not interfere too much in the rural
villages. However, such an optimistic situation did not occur. The Afghan government soon
began to show problems, just as the Taliban was regrouping. The Afghan government would
have to increasingly compete with the Taliban and provide a better bargain. Yet, 18 years later,
Afghanistan has not been able to do so. Nearly two decades later there are still problems with
governance, corruption, the justice system, and the drug trade that hinder Afghan efforts to create
a better deal.
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Governance
The first issue addressed by the United States was the development of a legitimate
government for Afghanistan. On December 5, 2001, the Bonn Agreement was signed by twentyfive prominent Afghans. The agreement would set up a timeline for the establishment of an
Afghan government beginning with the Interim Authority on December 22, headed by Hamid
Karzai.194
Yet just because there was an official government, did not mean that the new government
controlled the country. The United States and its allies did not have the forces on the ground to
secure the country until a national army and police force could be trained. In February 2002,
there were just 9,000 international troops, most of which were in the capital of Kabul.195 What
forces there were outside of Kabul were for the most part special forces looking for remnants of
the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This was a deliberate decision by the United States. Many in the
administration wanted a light footprint approach. As former President George W. Bush states in
his autobiography, “We were all wary of repeating the experience of the Soviets and the British,
who ended up looking like occupiers.”196 Both former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and
Undersecretary for Defense Policy Douglas Feith made similar statements in their
autobiographies.197 The specter of the failed invasions by the British and Soviets made for a
convincing argument against a large occupying force.
However, this also caused the U.S. to have to rely on local warlords. These were often
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government officials who, while technically under Karzai’s control, did not answer to the central
government and ran their appointed provinces as if it were their personal kingdom. This led to
the new Afghanistan government receiving little to no tax and custom revenue from the
provinces controlled by these warlords.198 The problem became so bad that, in July of 2002,
Pakistan had to deliver $10 million to Kabul in suitcases in order to pay government workers.199
This lack of control President Karzai had outside of the capital led to him being nicknamed the
“Mayor of Kabul”.200
In the first few months of 2002, the United States was content with this arrangement. The
warlords did have sizeable armies that provided security and they financed a variety of
reconstruction projects. There also seemed to be a sense that, even as a central government was
being created, that Afghanistan was ungovernable by a central authority. Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld held the opinion that Karzai should govern “the Chicago way”, meaning using a
combination of “patronage and political incentives” to entice warlords to follow him.201 This led
to the United States having little interest in strengthening the central government and disarming
warlords.
Despite this, Karzai would make important progress. On December 3, 2002 all militias
were outlawed and were given one year to disband.202 In May 2003, Karzai held a meeting with
12 provincial governors and threatened to resign if they did not start to deliver tax and custom
revenues.203 The money was promptly delivered. In August 2003, Karzai announced that
officials could no longer hold both civil and military positions.204 Besides threatening to resign
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however, Karzai did not have much power to enforce such decrees. When warlords did comply,
they often found ways to circumvent the objective of reforms. For example, many of the
warlords turned their militias into private security companies to avoid completely disbanding
them.205
This would change in 2004 when President Bush announced “Accelerating Success”, a
change in policy that would increase investment into the country.206 As part of the plan, there
was a greater emphasis on supporting the disarmament of warlords. The new U.S. ambassador,
Zalmay Khalilzad, would personally see many of the warlords over the next two years. One
notable instance was when Abdul Rashid Dostum took over the city of Maimana in northern
Afghanistan. Dostum had for the last year been complaining that he had been given no
government position and refused to demobilize his militia. When an Afghan National Army
battalion was deployed to restore order to the city, Dostum threatened to attack the army and kill
the American advisors attached to the unit. In response, the U.S. sent two B-1 bombers to fly low
over Dostum’s house. Soon after, Dostum agreed to demobilize and was subsequently offered a
position in the Karzai administration. A similar approach would be used with the provincial
governor of Herat, Ismail Khan, who had actually attacked ANA forces. The combination of a
thinly veiled threat of American military force and the promise of a government position in
Kabul would secure his cooperation.207
This did not, though, make the central government the undisputed power in the country.
Rather, a sort of alliance was created. The central government would give out administrative
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posts where warlords could siphon taxes, take bribes, and be given lucrative American contracts.
In exchange, the warlords agreed to send some of the tax money to the central government and
use their soldiers to keep order in the areas where they were positioned. There also seemed to be
an acknowledgement among the warlords that the central government had the support of the
international community and that it was in everyone’s best interest to keep that support. This can
be seen when tax revenue was immediately handed over when Karzai threatened to resign.
However, there continued to be battles between various warlords, with the central
government largely staying on the sidelines. Such as when a firefight erupted between the men of
Atta Muhammad Noor, the governor of Balkh province, and Asif Mohmand, a provincial
councilman, at Mazar-i-Sharif International Airport. Throughout their feud the National Police
refused to get involved.208 To put this in perspective, this would be as if the governor of
California sent men to kill a state senator and got into a firefight at San Francisco International
Airport.
The United States was often unwittingly drawn into these power disputes. In May 2002,
U.S. special forces, working on information supplied by the Kandahar provincial governor,
raided the home of Hajji Burget Khan, a leader of the Ishaqzai tribe and a respected elder of the
village of Maiwand. He and fifty-five others were arrested. It was not until five days later that
the American interrogators realized that none of them were Taliban or al-Qaeda. Khan had, in
fact, been an early supporter of the United States. Unfortunately, he was also a potential rival to
the provincial governor, Gul Agha Sherzai. By the time the Americans realized their mistake, the
damage had been done. Hajji Burget Khan had died from wounds sustained during the raid and
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the women of the house forced to come out and be hand-cuffed by American men.209 Upon
hearing this, one woman berated her male family members saying, “You people have big turbans
on your heads but what have you done? You are cowards! You can’t even protect us. You call
yourselves men?”210
Over the next few months, Gul Agha Sherzai would cement his hold over the village and
its surrounding district. In August of 2002, Maiwand’s entire police force was arrested for being
“al Qaeda-Taliban” and replaced with men appointed by Sherzai. Such U.S.-assisted attacks
were also not unique to Maiwand. Many Afghans would use American muscle to solve grudges
and political rivalries. The Americans, often ignorant of the local politics and with no
independent intelligence network of their own, took information given to them at face value.
These raids would kill or alienate many local leaders, the loss of which would result in the
Afghan government losing much of its legitimacy in the countryside.211
The current relationship between the government and warlords can best be summarized
with the example of Abdul Razziq. A former militia leader for his tribe, he later became a
colonel in the border police and many members of his militia were made part of his police force.
Due to his power, he was the unofficial governor of the district. When Americans talked to the
official district governor, his inevitable response was “Ask Razziq.” Razziq gave a portion of the
profits from his illegal activities to Karzai and other politicians and made sure that enough legal
revenue came through the border to keep the government’s coffers, if not full, at least not empty.
Unlike other police and army units, Razziq was an effective Taliban fighter, with his men both
motivated and well paid. Yet some of those same Taliban being killed were created by Razziq, as
the rival tribes around his territory had been targeted by Razziq and joined the Taliban for
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protection. While American officials would encourage him to reform, such efforts were
ineffective as Razziq was protected from any punishment by President Karzai. There was talk of
pressuring Karzai to remove Razziq, in the end his ability to secure his section of the border
against Taliban incursion proved too valuable to the war effort.212
Razziq is emblematic of the situation with warlords in Afghanistan. While often better at
governing and providing security than Kabul’s appointed governors, they are also divisive in the
regions they are located and heavily contribute to the culture of corruption. Thus, a situation can
develop where a warlord is creating just as many insurgents as he is killing. For its part, the
central government must walk a fine line between keeping the warlords in-check, while at the
same time giving them the resources to fight the Taliban.
The warlord problem is exacerbated by the unitary-style of government Afghanistan has.
Despite America’s light footprint approach and Rumsfeld’s “Chicago-style” governance idea,
Afghanistan has a very centralized government. Provincial and district (the equivalent of a U.S.
state and county) governors are appointed by the national government. Town governors and
provincial councils are elected, but these have virtually no power or discretionary spending.213
Thus, local officials who the people know and trust are often sidelined, especially when those
officials are not in the good graces of the regional warlord appointed by the central government.
It is easy to see why America was supportive of the unitary system. A system where
warlords would have to compete in elections with local leaders would have required a significant
American peace-keeping presence to ensure elections were fair and that warlords accepted the
results. One could argue that an American presence is precisely what Afghanistan has had for the
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last 18 years, but at the time the United States did not expect to be involved in the country for so
long. Making deals with those that had the power to immediately provide security and order was
the cheaper and quicker option. Long-term however, the system has proven to be anything but
beneficial to the stability of the country.

Corruption
Corruption has been a continual problem for the Afghan government, with surveys
showing consistently high levels of perceived corruption and personal experience with paying
bribes.214 In 2005, Afghanistan would be ranked by Transparency International as the 41st most
corrupt country in the world.215 By 2018, it moved to 8th most corrupt.216 In 2014 General John
Allen, former commander of the international forces in Afghanistan, stated “the great challenge
to Afghanistan’s future is not the Taliban or Pakistani safe havens... The existential threat to the
long-term viability of modern Afghanistan is corruption.”217 It should be noted that corruption is
not a problem in and of itself. Many countries, such as the other three case studies in this paper,
have had problems with corruption. However, Afghanistan has been particularly affected for two
reasons. One is the presence of the previously discussed warlords that extort the population for
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their own benefit. The warlords also give the population an identifiable face that symbolizes the
problems of the government much better than an abstruse bureaucracy. The second is the fact
that the Taliban has proven to be more effective administrators than the government.
The best example of why warlords have proved to be such a problem is the case of
Sharafuddin. Sharafuddin, a baker, was repeatedly arrested and tortured by the local police from
2002 to 2005. Each time his family had to pay a bribe for his release. His family would save
money specifically for these bribes that they knew would have to be paid every few months.
Until, that is, in 2005 when the Taliban killed the head of the governor’s intelligence unit.218
The governor of Sharafuddin’s province was Gul Agha Sherzai, the same man that had killed the
leadership of the village of Maiwand. Reportedly, when one of his men asked Sherzai why they
don’t simply kill the people they keep arresting, Sherzai replied: “There are two ways to peel this
egg. One is to break it open forcefully, but then you make a mess, and you’ll lose some of the
yolk. The other way is to do it carefully, a number of small cracks one after the other—and you
get as much as you can out of it.”219 Too many officials were like Sherzai; using their area of
responsibility as a source of income which, just as the killing of local leaders, would come to
alienate the population.
The problem of corruption is enabled by the unitary-style of government that Afghanistan
has. As described earlier, many local officials, such as Sherzai, are appointed by the central
government. As a result, it is easy for the Afghan president to appoint officials that will
contribute to the network of corruption. With no elections and a lack of accountability for
wrongdoing, there is also little incentive to gain the support of the population.
Unfortunately, warlords are just part of the problem. Throughout Afghanistan’s
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bureaucracy there is a culture of corruption which limits the government’s ability to fulfill
services, at a time when Afghanistan is competing with a Taliban shadow government. Nepotism
and bribery have become the cornerstones of employment within the government.220 Teachers,
for example, have to pay a bribe equal to their first year’s salary.221 This can make it hard to
fulfill the demand for education as many teachers will be able to pay for to get the credentials to
be a teacher, but have to save their money for a bribe. A 2017 corruption report on the Ministry
of Education found that 75% of those who attained teaching credentials were unable to find
employment.222 This makes it twice as hard to recruit female teachers for girl schools as many
families will not want to make such an investment on their daughter, especially if she has
brothers who will also need to pay bribes to get jobs.223 Considering that education for girls is
something that is generally desired even in conservative communities and something that the
Taliban does not offer, not hiring teachers because of the inability to pay a bribe severely
restricts the government’s ability to offer a service that the Taliban cannot.224
Even when the government can employ qualified staff, corruption can still cause
problems in terms of management. Officials are often involved in bribery networks in which they
pay superiors to keep their jobs and receive promotions, creating a chain of corruption where no
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one is clean.225 The need to pay in to this bribery network causes low-level employees to have to
offload these costs to the average citizen. Teachers, for example, often charge for supplies and
good test scores, which leads to disappointment and resentment from parents, especially those
who cannot pay for what should be a free education.226 The constant need to pay bribes and the
ability for employees to be paid without actually having to work has led to the Taliban being
viewed as the better option for managing these government programs. This is largely due to the
fact that the Taliban are much more interested in fulfilling a service than in using a hospital for
something like a money laundering scheme. Under the Taliban, employees are required to report
to work, cannot extort bribes from customers, and, while priority is given to Taliban members,
must attend to the needs of everyone.227 It is thus hard to convince the population to support the
government when the Taliban does its job so much better.
From 2015 to 2022, the U.S. has pledged over $36 million to be spent on anti-corruption
and transparency.228 However, the problem with U.S. efforts to curb corruption is that they are
solely based around supporting the Afghan government. Things like the training of prosecutors,
gifting of computer systems, and the help of U.S. law enforcement are only as useful as
Afghanistan’s willingness to use them, of which there has been little. This unwillingness has
caused generally only low-level crimes to be prosecuted. High-level arrests are rare due to pushback from the Afghan government. For example, when U.S. law enforcement worked with
Afghan anti-corruption units to arrest one of President Karzai’s aides, Karzai immediately had
the aide released and would later restrict the amount of foreign involvement in corruption
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investigations.229
When met with such push-back, the U.S. has been loath to press the issue, causing
frustration among Americans who have been tasked with anti-corruption. The director of the
Afghan Threat Finance Cell, a U.S.-Afghan organization created to root out illegal financial
networks, would articulate these frustrations saying, “We were asked to identify high-profile
targets that the Administration could then push President Karzai to take action against. . . . In
each instance, once President Karzai resisted, our leadership folded.”230 The problem is that too
many Afghan officials are involved in corrupt dealings. To arrest all of them would be to
essentially dismantle the government. There was also the idea that the United States needed to
pick its battles wisely. Too much pressure on too many people could hurt America’s overall
influence within the country. As one anonymous U.S. official explained, “There were a million
things we were trying to do, and all of them depended on the Karzai regime as an effective
partner.”231
In an October 14th, 2009 meeting, President Obama articulated a goal of getting
Afghanistan’s corruption to a “Bangladesh-level”, in which corruption was limited to the small
bribes required to get work done.232 In that same meeting Defense Secretary Robert Gates argued
“No government in Central Asia is a democracy and delivers services well. We can’t aim too
high.”233 Such statements were, in effect, surrenders to the institution of corruption in
Afghanistan. While the United States has on occasion pressured Afghanistan to remove
individual governors that were especially harmful to local stability, the U.S. has largely accepted
229
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the status quo.234

Justice System
From 2003 to 2015 the United States spent more than $1 billion on improving the justice
system in Afghanistan.235 However, the money was spread among four different agencies, with a
2015 SIGAR audit finding that there was no comprehensive, overarching strategy to tie the
activities of these agencies together. The audit also notes that U.S. efforts have “faced pervasive
corruption, lack of will, and other challenges in trying to improve the Afghan justice sector.”236
Like many aspects of Afghanistan, the justice system is hampered by corruption. Surveys
by multiple organizations have all reported that Afghans view the judiciary as one of, if not the
most corrupt institutions in the country.237 This is in contrast to the Taliban justice system which,
while sometimes overly harsh, is generally perceived as honest by the population.238 Even when
there have been instances of corruption, residents still view the Taliban as a better option, with
one Afghan elder explaining, “The Taliban court is for all people of Afghanistan but Afghan
court is only for rich people.”239 The court can even be more popular than the Taliban itself, with
one Afghan farmer stating, “I am against the Taliban system in general and do not want them,
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but when we talk about their judgement, they are really judging according to Sharia law and I
really respect their judgement, not their activities in Afghanistan, not their fighting and not their
killing.”240 As discussed earlier, the United States has offered support to battle corruption in the
justice sector but the lack of will on the part of the Afghan government has meant there has been
little progress. Many in the State and Justice Department have come to view it as a lost cause.241
To compound the corruption problem, the Afghan government’s judiciary also lacks the
resources and legitimacy of the Taliban. In 2011, 17% of districts did not have a judge.242 While
some of the vacancies are undoubtedly due to security concerns, the Afghan government has also
had trouble recruiting qualified judges due to the high level of illiteracy in the country. This
means that in many areas, especially in the southern provinces, villagers who want their case
heard have to make long trips into the provincial capital, which many do not have the time for.
The Taliban, while also having problems with recruitment, are better able to serve the
community due to their judges being mobile and moving village to village.243 Cases in the
government justice system also take longer.244 Partly this is due to the lack of judges and court
staff, but it is also due to the more rigorous system of a western-style court. It should be noted,
though, that the Taliban do make a great amount of effort to look for evidence in order to bring
about a satisfactory verdict. When taking a district, records of land ownership and prior litigation
verdicts are highly prized. When they cannot forcibly take the records, the Taliban will either

240

Quoted in Ibid., p. 37.
SIGAR, Rule of Law in Afghanistan, pp. 12-13 and 19.
242
Calculated using data from Antonio Giustozzi et al., Shadow Justice: How the Taliban Run Their Judiciary?, p.
35; and Michael Shurkin, Subnational Government in Afghanistan, p. 5.
243
Antonio Giustozzi et al., Shadow Justice: How the Taliban Run Their Judiciary?, pp. 20 and 35; Ashley
Jackson, Life under the Taliban Shadow Government, p. 19; Azam Ahmed, “Taliban Justice Gains Favor as Official
Afghan Courts Fail”; Kara Jensen, “Obstacles to Accessing the State Justice System in Rural Afghanistan,” Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies vol. 18 no. 2 (2011): pp. 930-950,
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1466&context=ijgls, pp. 946-949; and Soraya
Sarhaddi Nelson, “Taliban Courts Filling Justice Vacuum in Afghanistan.”
244
Antonio Giustozzi et al., Shadow Justice: How the Taliban Run Their Judiciary?, p. 36.
241

62

steal them or bribe a government official.245
Another issue is legitimacy. Government courts are not only corrupt, but they work using
a western-influenced legal system. Whereas the courts run by village elders or the Taliban use
traditional tribal law or Sharia law, which are viewed as more legitimate and fair. Not all
villagers may understand Sharia law, but all view it as legitimate. Whereas the government
justice system, which uses more secular laws, is not well understood by the population and since
it is not connected to any larger tradition, there is little legitimacy in it.
USAID funded several programs to increase the government’s involvement in traditional
village courts and to create a link between them and the courts in the cities.246 The idea being
that by creating these links, villages would be more likely to view the government courts as a
legitimate alternative. The biggest of these programs was the Rule of Law Stabilization–Informal
(RLS-I) program, which sought to integrate Afghan law with tribal law, stop certain “harmful
social practices”, and make villagers more knowledgeable about the government justice
system.247 Unfortunately, the program’s final report in 2014 showed: “Collaboration between the
formal justice system and TDR actors is often one-way, with the formal justice system referring
cases to TDR actors but TDR actors not referring cases to the formal justice system. Qualitative
interviews indicated a generally poor perception of the formal justice system by TDR actors.”248
In conclusion, the government justice system has not been able to be seen as a real option
among the majority of the population. The integration between tribal and government courts
should have come much sooner, with more input from village elders about the system that the
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central government was creating. However, that is debatably a secondary problem. Unless
Afghanistan can fix its bigger issues, such as corruption and lack of education, it is unlikely that
the government will be able to have either the legitimacy or the physical reach to become the
better alternative to the Taliban’s system of justice.

Drug Economy
One of the major objectives of the Afghanistan War was to stop the country’s production
of opium poppies. Partly this was due to Western political pressure. Afghanistan was the largest
producer of opium in the world, and thus destroying the poppy production would help to
alleviate the West’s own drug problems. There was also the fact that the Taliban is heavily
involved in the drug trade, transporting drugs across the Pakistan border and protecting poppy
farmers’ crops.249 Creating a legitimate economy would not only deprive the Taliban of a source
of funding, but also cut some of the ties that farmers had with the Taliban.
The United States, at first, was reluctant to put resources into this endeavor. The Defense
Department did not think that counter narcotics was part of its mission in Afghanistan, and
worried it would interfere with counter-terrorism.250 The State Department’s Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) did not even have a Foreign Service
Officer until spring of 2003.251 The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) did not open an office
until February 2003, and even then could not go outside Kabul due to security concerns.252 Partly
this was due to the fact that the UK had been given the lead for counter-narcotics and thus such
activities were deemed outside of the United States’ responsibilities. However, as the cultivation
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of poppies began to increase there were fears that Afghanistan would turn into a Narco-State and
the curbing of illicit crops gained greater importance.
One option was eradication. The first attempt was a UK-funded program named
Operation Drown. In what would later be described as “an appalling piece of complete raw
naiveté”, Operation Drown would offer money in exchange for farmers destroying their poppy
crop.253 However, instead of going to each farm and directly giving the money to the farmer and
destroying the crop, the money was instead given to the governors and tribal leaders. This led to
a vast amount of corruption and a strengthening of warlords’ power. Much of the compensation
was simply pocketed with farmers having to pay bribes for their crop not to be destroyed. For
those few that did receive compensation and destroyed their crop, there was no incentive to stop
growing poppy beyond the year they were compensated. Such criticism would lead to future
eradication compensation only occurring in areas where alternative crops were being funded. 254
Future eradication efforts would not be much more effective. An independent force was
created specifically for eradication in 2004. The force would go by several names until finally
settling on the Poppy Eradication Force. However, it was never integrated into the government as
planned and proved to be unable to destroy the amount of crop needed to make a difference. The
force was ultimately shut down in 2009.255 International forces continued to rely on provincial
governors for eradication who, as Operation Drown had shown, were not very reliable. By 2017,
the United States had spent $937 million on eradication efforts.256
Another method was interdiction, which is the targeting of opium labs and arresting of
drug smugglers. The biggest problem in this effort was that, no matter how much the United
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States financed and strengthened Afghan law enforcement, those law enforcement agencies
could do nothing if the smugglers they arrested were protected by government officials. The
problem would become such a problem that in 2005 an entirely separate branch of the justice
system was created to handle drug cases, known as the Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC).
The CNJC had its own judges and prosecutors who were carefully vetted by international forces.
These measures led the CNJC to be seen as the “most capable, least corrupt justice system in
Afghanistan.”257
Between 2005 and 2008, the CNJC convicted 1,550 traffickers.258 Yet the vast majority
of these were low-level drug traffickers. The fact is that much of Afghanistan’s elite is involved
in the drug trade. The previously discussed warlord Abdul Razziq, for example, made a lot of his
money by charging drug traffickers for the ability to cross his section of the border.259 In 2005,
the U.S. pressured Karzai to remove Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, the governor of Helmand
province, because of his involvement in the drug trade. Though he then went on to become a
member of the House of Elders, one of the legislative houses.260 Without the ability to target
high-level offenders and with poppy production continuing to increase, U.S. interdiction efforts
were like trying to remove water from a sinking boat with a soup spoon, while the other person
on the boat is continuing to punch more holes in.
A proposed measure to plug this leaking boat was to convince farmers to grow a plant
other than poppies. One of the early suggestions for an alternative crop was cotton, first
suggested in December 2001 by a former USAID employee named Dick Scott. However, this
effort soon ran into problems. When USAID restored one of the old government cotton gins,
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several smaller private gins began to appear around the south in anticipation of an explosion of
cotton production. The government though, did not want the competition when it had so few
sources of revenue and confiscated all privately-owned gins. USAID refused to give money to a
cotton industry that whose cotton gins were entirely nationalized.261 USAID did also not like that
potential cotton farmers demanded free seeds and a guaranteed purchased price. Whether USAID
realized the U.S. cotton industry is also heavily subsidized by the government is unknown.262
USAID would continue to be hostile to cotton, using several excuses before finally
settling on the idea that promoting cotton would violate the Bumpers Amendment, which forbids
USAID from providing funds to agricultural products that might compete with U.S. products.263
In 2007, when an Afghan businessman named Yosuf Mir asked for funding to repair a textile
factory that could employ up to 12,000 people, USAID refused. Mir had made the mistake of
boasting that such a factory would promote thousands of farmers to grow cotton instead of
poppy. In an email, USAID explained that such a promotion of cotton would violate the
Bumpers Amendment, and thus was not available for American aid.264
USAID was far more interested in promoting nuts and fruits; as such crops were more
valuable than cotton or poppy. While these were viable alternatives on paper, they sometimes did
not work in practice.265 Nut or fruit producing trees, for example, take several years to mature
and thus farmers would need an alternative form of income in the years that they wait for their
farm to be productive. Yet such support was not always available, especially in rural areas where
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access to jobs is limited. Aid projects often only lasted a couple of years, which impeded the
long-term cultivation of licit crops. A 2018 USAID report would acknowledge this, saying:
“programs implemented over the past dozen years have in general lacked a
consistent and longer-term strategic focus…Frequently the project vehicles
through which programs are implemented have had short, two- to three-year lifespans—clearly inadequate to the task of fomenting sustainable stakeholder
commitment to transitioning permanently away from engagement in illicit
activities.”266
All of this is not, of course, an attempt to promote the cotton industry, but rather an
example of the lack of focus in regards to counter-narcotics policy. Rather than focusing on
simply providing a livelihood that would stop farmers in a region from growing poppy, USAID
was thinking of how Afghanistan could best compete on the international market.267 As one
USAID official complained to SIGAR, “No one looked at opium from a livelihoods perspective
in USAID. It was about economics and value chains, not livelihoods.”268 In effect, USAID
pursued the perfect to the detriment of the good.
Another problem was that very few of USAID’s alternative crop programs “actually
considered opium poppy cultivation in their design or during implementation.”269 This led to
projects that actually increased poppy cultivation.270 Part of the reason for this was that USAID
was opposed to their agency being used as the spearhead for counter-narcotics and did not
consider it as part of their mission. As a result, USAID did not change their development projects
to target poppy cultivation and instead gave the argument that any development was alternative
development.271 According to Doug Wankel, director of the Kabul Counter Narcotics Task
Force, USAID “gave the feeling they didn’t want to be in the photograph when the picture
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was taken.”272
The effectiveness of U.S. counter narcotics can be easily shown in the change in
estimated poppy production from 2002 to 2018. According to the U.N., poppy cultivation was
estimated at 74,000 hectares in 2002 and 263,000 hectares in 2018. Estimated opium produced
from these poppies was 3,400 metric tons in 2002 and 6,400 metric tons in 2018. In 2018,
eradication of poppy fields amounted to just 406 hectares, which is .0015% the size of the crop
that was successfully cultivated. By any measure, it is clear that America’s attempt to transform
Afghanistan’s agricultural economy and prevent the country from becoming a narco-state has
failed.273
What Afghanistan’s counter narcotics needed was its own clear-hold-build strategy.
Eradication immediately followed by compensation and then long-term support for an alternative
crop. While the U.S. and its allies did do all of these things at one time or another, it was never
part of one cohesive plan. As one Defense Department official noted, “Everyone did their own
thing, not thinking how it fit in with the larger effort. State was trying to eradicate, USAID was
marginally trying to do livelihoods, and DEA was going after bad guys.”274 This disorganization
has ultimately led to the drug economy remaining a significant part of Afghan society.

Conclusion
The question of how successful the United States has been in making Afghanistan into a
capable state is difficult due to the fact that it depends on how one measures it. If one compares it
to pre-2002 Afghanistan than it has been a great success. By any statistical measure Afghanistan
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has grown by leaps and bounds due to the influx of international aid. Yet if one compares it to
the goals of the war against the Taliban (the building of a government which can win the loyalty
of the population) it has not been such a success.
The United States has spent a total of $132.5 billion on nation-building in Afghanistan.
What the United States has received as a result of these billions of dollars is a stalemate.
Currently, the government controls around 33% of the country, with the Taliban controlling
18%.275 Little progress has been made in curbing corruption, the power of warlords, or
increasing the ability of the government to provide essential services. These deficiencies have
resulted in the Taliban filling in the gaps. The Taliban provide their own court system, supervise
schools, and ensure consistent electricity to villages they control. In most cases, the Taliban
makes use of government infrastructure and resources, often with government permission as
dealing with the Taliban is seen as the only way to ensure the Afghan people have access to
healthcare and education.
In many areas the Taliban are merely one form of government. This allows citizens to
choose who they go to for support. They may use government schools managed by the Taliban,
use Taliban courts to supplement tribal courts, and rely on local elders to govern the community.
Thus, in many areas, neither side is totally legitimate, but each provides certain benefits.276 This
makes the Afghan government’s flaws all the more frustrating, as it is clear that it could gain the
loyalty of some of these communities if it only could create a government that better represented
and cared for its people.
America’s inability to improve Afghanistan is largely due to two reasons. One is its
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reliance on the Afghan government. The United States cannot kick a governor out of office or
prosecute a corrupt individual without the Afghan President’s approval. This has caused any
successes to be inconsequential. Like Vietnam, America has had a problem with the fact that it
views Afghan participation to be integral to successful nation-building, but the Afghan
government has not been willing to fully participate.
The second reason for America’s failure is that in the initial year of involvement the
United States created a very centralized political system. Historically, Afghan rulers have
governed the country by either allowing a large degree of autonomy outside of the urban centers
or using a large amount of violence to maintain control.277 The problem is that the United States
has created a system which attempts to extend the central government down to the village level,
using a government that is both weak and flawed. If the United States was able to coerce that
government to change so that the people willingly accept the central government into their
villages, the centralized system might not be a problem. As it stands though, America is in a
situation where it is supporting a government that is simply unsuitable for the country it is trying
to rule; especially when there is an alternative in the form of the Taliban.
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IRAQ

Iraq is unique in that it can be considered both a success and a failure. The period from
2003 to 2019 can be considered a successful, if rocky, nation-building effort. The period from
2010 to 2014, in which there was a resurgence of the conflict and rise of the Islamic State, is
obviously a failure of nation-building. This analysis will thus compare the eleven years between
2003 and 2014.
Much of the failure would be due to the inability for the U.S. to subdue sectarian tensions
between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the country. Thus, the first issue that will be discussed in
this case study will be the history of sectarianism in Iraq. There will then be a discussion of some
of the major decisions made during the period from April 2003 to June 2004 when America
occupied the country. The results of this initial nation-building effort will be seen in the Anbar
Awakening, from late 2006 to 2008. Finally, there will be a history of the events leading up to
the rise of the Islamic State, which showed that the nation that America had helped formed was
not as strong as initially thought.

Sectarianism
Sectarianism, or the conflict between the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam, is undoubtedly
Iraq’s biggest problem. While there was some Shia involvement, the insurgency was largely a
Sunni driven affair, with insurgent heartland located in the so-called “Sunni Triangle” of western
Iraq. The Iraqi Civil War was a conflict between the Sunni Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
and the Shia-dominated Iraq government. Some, including both regular Iraqis on the street and
academics, have made the argument that Iraq had never been so divided along sectarian lines and
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that the Americans had created this conflict through bad policy.278 Reider Visser specifically
points to Bremer’s policies during the first year of occupation for, “turning Iraqis into sectarian
extremists of a kind completely alien to the country's long history of sectarian coexistence.”279
Outside influences are certainly a factor. As will be discussed, De-Baathification and the
dissolving of the military were seen by many Sunnis as de-Sunnification. Yet it is also clear that
these divisions have existed for a long time.
One reason for this division is due to the sectarian nature of Iraqi nationalism, at least as
seen by some Sunnis. Iraq has, for hundreds of years, been viewed as the battleground between
the Arab and Persian cultures. Hatred and suspicion of Iran is in fact held by both Shias and
Sunnis. As one example, when Bremer suggested that Hussein al-Shahristani be made Prime
Minister of the Transitional Government, the idea was resoundingly rejected by prominent Shias,
due to the simple fact that Shahristani had an Iranian name.280 However, within the Sunni
community, religion has taken on greater importance when thinking about this conflict.
Due to most of the population in Iran being Shia, the very act of being a Shia was seen by
some as inherently un-Iraqi and un-Arab, with Iraq’s Shia being viewed as potential agents for
Iran. During the late 19th century, the conversion of many Iraqis to the Shia sect would greatly
alarm the Ottoman Empire, with various methods used to try and combat the spread of the Shia
faith, such as increased investment in Sunni religious schools.281 After the 1979 Iranian
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Revolution, Iraqi Shiites would protest and call for a revolution of their own.282 Though these
protests would ultimately not gain traction within the larger Shia community, it did continue the
narrative that the Shias in Iraq were inherently disloyal. This distrust would lead to tens of
thousands of Shiites being expelled during the Iran-Iraq.283 During the 1991 uprising in the Shiadominated south, Saddam Hussein would justify his harsh quelling of the rebellion by labelling
the revolting Shia “Iranians”.284 This labeling would not be helped by the fact that exiled Shias in
Iran that crossed the border to support the rebellion put up posters showing Ayatollah Khomeini
and demanding an Iranian-style Islamic republic.285
While such propaganda might be seen as ludicrous to an outsider, the state narrative of
the rebellion being instigated by Iran was taken seriously by many Sunnis. When Wafiq alSamarrai, the former Director of Military Intelligence who defected to Kurdistan in 1994, was
asked why he and others did not participate in the 1991 revolts he replied, “the success of the
intifada would have meant the annihilation of the Arabs from central Iraq; therefore, backing the
regime was the only alternative.”286 Even outside of Iraq in the Arab world, the narrative of an
Iranian-backed rebellion took hold, with Palestinian writer Mohammad Asa’ad Bayuth alTimeem saying in a debate on Al-Jazeera that forces from “neighboring countries” had infiltrated
the south and incited the Shia to rebel.287 In discussing the mass graves made during the 1991
rebellion, a former Iraqi diplomat would argue that, “the majority of the people they found in
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these mass graves were Iranian secret police and Iranian Revolutionary Guards.”288 In large part,
this acceptance of the regime’s narrative would be due to the fact that any disturbance against
Iraq, whether internal or external, has a tendency to be blamed on Iran. For example, many tribal
leaders in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province held the view that Al-Qaeda in Iraq was secretly
funded by Iran.289
There was also the fact that the Ottomans, British and most recently Saddam Hussein
would all put Sunnis in the leadership positions.290 This caused some Sunnis to feel as if they
were destined to rule and that the Shia had traits that were not suited to leadership positions. A
Sunni sheikh articulated this sentiment perfectly saying, “They cannot rule Iraq properly. They
cannot take charge of Iraq in the same manner as the Sunnis. The Shiites are backwards.”291 A
Sunni businessman complained, “The Americans made a big mistake when they came to Iraq.
Sunnis ruled Iraq for 400 years. Sunnis always worked in the security and administration of
Iraq.”292 Such sectarian disdain and ideas of pre-destined rule were bound to irritate the Shias,
who view the power that comes as the majority of the population being unfairly withheld from
them for decades.
The two groups see fundamental aspects of the Iraq nation, such as the definition of
nationalism and legitimacy, very differently from each other. Iraqi nationalism has always been
skewed towards its Sunni population, whose Sunni-Arab identity tended to be interlinked with
Iraqi national identity.293 In the words of former Shia-Iraqi politician Ali Allawi, “The narrative
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of Iraq fashioned by its leaders and pedagogues was compromised for many of its citizens who
did not share in, or resonate to, its founding symbols.”294 The mass killings used to quell the
1991 uprising would destroy whatever shred of legitimacy the regime of Saddam Hussein had
left. Among Sunnis however, Saddam still had the minimum amount of legitimacy to stay in
power due to him still being a bulwark against Iran and his upholding of Arab-Sunni domination.
These differing views of legitimacy led to very different perceptions towards the
American invasion and subsequent nation-building effort. Among Sunnis, “a foreign invasion
was unfathomable regardless of the shortcomings and failures of the regime; Shi’as on the other
hand, according the regime no legitimacy whatsoever, regarded foreign invasion as a necessary
evil.”295 The reality of this situation can be seen in polling. An ABC poll from early 2004
showed that the Shias were twice as likely to say America liberated Iraq rather than humiliated it,
were 18% less likely to oppose U.S. military presence, and were three times less likely to
approve of attacks on coalition forces.296 This is not to insinuate the Shia were wholly supportive
of the American presence. However, they were much more likely to work with the occupation to
ensure a speedy withdrawal rather than actively oppose it.
The argument that Iraq did not have serious sectarian problems before the American
invasion is simply incorrect. The occupation simply brought these divisions to the fore, as the
new regime threatened everything that Sunnis, both secular nationalists and Islamists, feared.
Namely, “the rise of a ‘Shi’a state’, Sunni marginalisation, loss of Iraqi sovereignty and the rise
of Iranian influence.”297 The test for America would be how it would create a unified nation
when such long-held divisions existed. As will be seen, what the United States can be criticized
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for is not fully grasping the magnitude of these divisions and how to properly deal with each
side’s fears.

Early Challenges
The occupation of Iraq began with the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA), led by retired General Jay Garner. Within weeks of ORHA moving into
Baghdad, it would be replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by Ambassador
Paul Bremer, in May 2003. These organizations would lay the groundwork for the establishment
of the modern Iraqi state, as well as the insurgency that the new Iraq had to face.
The United States began the liberation of Iraq with a plethora of assumptions about the
post-war reconstruction environment; many of which would prove to be false. It was assumed
that there would be some amount of looting, but besides buying more furniture all government
employees could begin work the day after liberation. In reality, not only were furniture and
electronics stolen, but also wiring and even plumbing. Then the building was set on fire.298 As a
result, 17 of the 23 ministry buildings were destroyed.299 It was assumed that Iraqi oil revenues
would be able to pay for much of the reconstruction. Again, this proved to be false, with
reconstruction costs far exceeding Iraq’s capacity, especially since much of the infrastructure for
oil production needed to be repaired or upgraded.300 President Bush would describe this
disconnect in his autobiography, saying, “There had been no Fortress Baghdad, no massive oil
field fires, no widespread starvation, no civilian massacre by Saddam, no WMD attack on our
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troops, and no terrorist attack on America or our allies.”301 War-planning had been focused on
the potential deliberate attacks by Saddam, not self-destructive anarchy. Soon after he arrived in
the country, Ambassador Bremer would observe, “it’s not that we didn’t plan. The problem is
that we planned for the wrong contingency.”302
It is hard to understate the challenge America was facing in Iraq. The military did not
have enough soldiers to bring law and order in the aftermath of liberation.303 The CPA was
understaffed and was not receiving funds quickly enough, crippling its ability to enact swift
reforms.304 The Iraqi people had high expectations for how America could improve their lives,
and were continually disappointed in how slow progress was taking.305 At the same time, other
Iraqis were suspicious of America’s motives. They viewed the American invasion as no more
than a necessary evil to topple Saddam and wanted the occupation ended quickly.306 All of this
created a situation where America had to stabilize and rebuild Iraq in as short amount of time as
possible using the minimum amount of people. Never before had America faced so many
problems needing to be solved in such a short amount of time.

De-Baathification
The Baath Party was the political party of Saddam Hussein and many positions in
government required membership. In order to stop any of those who committed crimes against
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humanity from gaining positions of power, the United States would “De-Baathify” the
bureaucracy by making it illegal for some party members to be in government. When DeBaathification was first conceived, only those in the top two positions in the Baath Party would
be removed from government.307 It was estimated that it would only affect one percent of the
country’s two million Baath party members, or about 20,000.308 However, it was later changed to
the top four positions, which not only affected the top leaders in the government, but also some
of the middle management.309 Between 2003 and 2005 over 65,000 civil servants were removed
from government.310 This created serious problems with restoring governance. At the Ministry of
Health, for example, a third of the employees were fired.311 At the Ministry of Finance, 19% of
its workforce was fired.312
De-Baathification was continually compared to de-Nazificaiton in Germany after the end
of WWII. Like de-Baathification, de-Nazification would affect a large portion of government
employees and turn public opinion against the American occupation. However, there was one
significant difference that helped to dilute the effect of de-Nazification, and it was the fact that
when the United States gave control of de-Nazification to the Germans, the Germans were
generally lenient in their prosecutions. The German public did not view Nazi party members as
especially dangerous and tended to be more empathetic, leading to many former bureaucrats
being able to come back into the government.313
By contrast, Iraq had a significant sectarian divide and thus an Iraq-led de-Baathification
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process did not lead to more lenient sentences. This sectarian divide would cause a hardline
attitude toward former Baathists, viewing any Baathist, especially Sunni Baathists, as potentially
dangerous. Iraqi politicians were heavily discouraged from promoting a more lenient policy, for
fear of being voted out of office by their Shia constituents.314 Ambassador Bremer attempted to
moderate de-Baathification and would use his authority to reinstate ten thousand teachers who
had lost their jobs.315 However, even Bremer would be unable to fully reign in de-Baathification,
lamenting that, “to say anything about de-Baathification would be to provoke a strong reaction
from the Shia.”316
Little progress would be made in the five years until 2008, when the Iraqi parliament
would pass the Accountability and Justice Act. This law made a number of reforms to deBaathification policy including allowing many former members to be eligible to return to
government, the return of pensions, and the creation of a new de-Bathification authority, called
the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC). This new commission, however, was made
up of the members of the former de-Baathification organization, the Higher National DeBa’athification Commission (HNDC). These commissioners were much more enthusiastic about
de-Baathification and in the 2010 election attempted to have over 500 candidates disqualified
and 376 officers in the security forces removed.317 Although only partially successful, the
attempt would fuel rising sectarian tensions. When the Bush administration started deBaathification, it was meant to model the successes of de-Nazification while avoiding its
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failures. Unfortunately, history soon repeated itself, but this time in a society which was far more
divided.318

Security Forces
It was planned that the Iraqi military would be used after the war as a kind of
Conservation Corps that would help to rebuild damaged infrastructure. However, instead of
staying in their garrisons and waiting until the war was over, soldiers instead looted their
garrisons and went home.319 When this occurred, it was decided that the military had essentially
“disbanded itself.”320 It was already known that the military would need to be reformed and
reorganized; due to it being tainted by its use as a tool of Saddam. Thus, by the military
disbanding, this was seen as a problem that had fixed itself.
On May 23, 2003 CPA Order Number 2 formally dissolved not only the military, but also
all of the intelligence agencies. Pensions would still be given out and there would be a one-time
payment for all employees who were not high level Baath Party members to help with the
transition.321 The problem was that this essentially put 500,000 people out of work at a time
when the unemployment rate was around 20%.322 To put this in context, this would be as if
America dissolved the entire Department of War during the Great Depression.323 Except that Iraq
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in 2003 was around five times smaller than America in the 1930s.324
Perhaps a bigger issue though with the security forces is that the new American-made
security force lacked legitimacy, especially by the Sunnis. The dissolving of the military was
seen as a part of de-Sunnification, especially as some Sunni officers saw their Shia comrades
called back to action while they were deemed too much of a risk to reemploy.325 The military and
police have consistently been accused of being dominated by the Shia who targets the Sunni
population. This has not been helped by the fact that there have been documented cases of
soldiers in the military, and especially in private militias, of stealing, beating, and committing
other criminal acts against civilians.326
In defending his position to dissolve the military, Ambassador Bremer has pointed to the
bad feelings the Shia have towards former officers in the military. In his book about his time in
Iraq, he relates one instance in which members of the IGC were incensed that a former
Republican Guard colonel was recruited by the Marines in Fallujah to head a paramilitary unit.
He concludes that, “The violent reaction to the Fallujah Brigade was dramatic proof of the
danger the coalition would have courted by trying to recall Saddam’s army, as some had
proposed.”327 Yet what Bremer failed to grasp is that the military had a nuanced position in Iraqi
society. The regular army, where many Shia had served, was less tainted than units like the
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Republican Guard, which was much more identified with the regime of Saddam.328 The army
was a more nationalistic entity that cut across the sectarian divide. The fact that the Fallujah
Brigade was led specifically by a Republican Guard colonel, and not a regular army colonel, is
very important to understanding the Shia reaction.
It is also important to remember that not even all Sunnis were supportive of Saddam. The
Republican Guard, often seen as the vanguard of his regime, was in fact not allowed inside
Baghdad for fear of a coup. Only the Special Republican Guard, who were recruited from the
area surrounding Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit, were allowed inside the city. 329 For many
Sunnis soldiers, Saddam was a man they tolerated, not supported.330 Being a part of the military
or intelligence service was also a part of many Sunnis’ identity and, as Ali Allawi summarized,
“to be suddenly and unceremoniously dumped greatly affected their sense of self-worth. Loss of
dignity was added to their impoverishment, and an anxious and resentful multitude retired to
their homes nursing their grievances about the new order.”331 Being an officer in the military or
intelligence service was also recognition of the Sunnis’ prestigious position in Iraqi society, and
their duty as a bulwark against Iranian influence.332 This line of thinking could not of course last
in a new Iraq, but an effort could have been made to make the transition less abrupt.
Iraq’s military was certainly in need of reform and reorganization. However, the method
that America used had little benefit and many detriments. A more limited disbanding of
328
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Saddam’s elite units such as the Republican Guard and Fedayeen Saddam would have achieved
much the same cleansing effect without the destruction of the entire military establishment.
These soldiers need not even be necessarily let go, but simply given new uniforms and integrated
into the regular army. Keeping the military relatively in-tact and still employing most Sunni
soldiers would have helped to alleviate Sunni fears that they were being sidelined, given a readyavailable force to maintain law and order, and have kept the legitimacy of the military. While
there still would have been problems with Shia fears of Sunnis officers and Sunnis feeling some
humiliation at their lower prestige, these problems would be less worrisome than hundreds of
thousands of angry veterans on the streets.

Government
The original plan for Iraq was to quickly hand over sovereignty to an Interim Iraqi
Authority. This political body would govern Iraq until elections could be held and the United
States’ would be limited to a supporting role, similar to how the United States dealt with
Afghanistan. There was, however, disagreement within the administration over this plan. The
State Department was especially against this, thinking the United States should directly govern
Iraq until it is stabilized and ready to be handed over to Iraqis. State’s idea for direct control
would gain momentum in the immediate aftermath of the war, when Iraq turned out to be much
more chaotic and in disrepair than previously thought.333 This need to establish stability was the
rational for the decision to give ORHA’s replacement, the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), “all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives.” 334
Iraqi politicians were placed in an advisory role in the form of the Iraqi Governing Council.
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Another issue with establishing an interim government right away was the lack of
legitimacy the exiles had. Out of the seven most prominent exiled leaders (whom Bremer would
come to call the G-7), only one was an Arab Sunni, creating the impression that such a
government run by exiles would be a Shia-only government.335 Yet even within the Shia
community, there was resentment over these exiles that had fled to safety and now expected to
come back to Iraq as leaders when they did not share in the suffering of the people.336 Muqtada
al-Sadr, whose father was killed for speaking against Saddam in the 1990s, would become a
powerful figure in the Shia community, in part because he was better able to connect with those
that had suffered under Saddam.337 The exiles had also been unable or unwilling to recruit more
members for an interim government that had such experience. This legitimacy problem would
lead to the decision to create a larger 25-member Iraq Governing Council (IGC) on July 13.338
The composition of the council was based on ethnicity and religion, with the number of members
that each group had based on that group’s size within Iraq’s population. While understandable
that the United States would want everyone to be represented, this membership based on
ethnicity and religiosity had the side effect of encouraging the hardening of sectarian identity, as
one could only be represented as a Sunni citizen, not just as an Iraqi.
Throughout the IGC’s term, the council would be frequently criticized, especially by
Bremer. When it was suggested in September 2003 that the United States hand over sovereignty
to the IGC Bremer protested saying, “Those people couldn’t organize a parade, let alone run a
country.”339 The IGC had trouble coming to a consensus, to the point where instead of a single
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president the council had a rotating presidency between nine members.340 The IGC was criticized
for not coming up with policy, not hiring enough staffers, frequently missing meetings, and
being generally incompetent.341 Ali Allawi, an exile that served as the Minister of Trade and later
Defense in the transitional government, admitted that the exiles were not prepared for governing,
saying “the reality was that Iraqi exiles had been mainly concerned with the political
arrangements and structures through which they would assume or inherit power, not with the
actual task of running the country on a day-to-day basis.”342
Yet, at the same time, with the real power being vested in the Coalition Provisional
Authority, there was little incentive for the Iraqi politicians to invest much time and energy into
governing. In a meeting with Ibrahim al-Jaafari, one of the members and rotating presidents of
the IGC, Bremer complained about the performance of the Council, to which Jaafari countered,
“If the Council is weak you have no one to blame but yourself…we cannot expect the council to
act responsibly if it doesn’t have the authority.”343 Giving more powers to the Iraqis and setting
up the council more like an actual transitional government, with a prime minister and legislative
body, might have encouraged greater enthusiasm among its members and given the transitional
leaders greater credibility at a time when many Iraqis were suspicious of any government created
by America.
The original transition plan envisioned by Bremer would be a two year process where the
United States would slowly grant increasing sovereignty to Iraq. However, both the
administration’s and the Iraqi population’s aversion to a long-term occupation would destroy
these plans. Ayatollah Sistani also demanded elections as soon as possible and delivered a fatwa
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that any constitution had to be written by elected officials.344 This would cause Bremer and the
United States to announce on November 15 a transition plan that would create a transitional
constitution and government by June 28, 2004. At that time, the United States officially ended its
occupation of Iraq.345
In January 2005 a transitional National Assembly was elected. However, many Sunnis
had boycotted the election and those who may not have wanted to participate in the boycott were
intimidated from doing so due to insurgent threats against polling stations. As a result, Sunni
Arabs, which made up around 20% of the country, won just 17 seats on the 275-seat Assembly,
or 6.2%. During the drafting of the 2005 constitution, Sunni members of the National Assembly
complained that they were not included in backroom negotiations, leading to the Sunnis
withdrawing from the constitutional committee on August 28.346 Due to fears that they would be
marginalized by the Shia majority, the Sunnis voted heavily against the constitution but were
unable to get the required two-thirds “No” votes in three provinces.347
The constitution would be criticized by outside analysts, who said that there was too
much vagueness in some articles, such as how much power the central government had and how
exactly oil revenues would be distributed.348 It should be noted though that Iraq has, in some
cases, intentionally kept language vague as a compromise. For example, how exactly Islam
should influence laws is up for interpretation. The constitution says that “No law may be enacted
that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.” However, there are other stipulations in the
constitution that potentially contradict this such as, “No law may be enacted that contradicts the
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principles of democracy.”349 This stipulation was written by the Sunnis and secular Shias to
ensure that a de-facto Shia Islamic republic was not created.350 It is also important to remember
that the American constitution also has vague and contradictory language. Whether this affects
the stability of the country depends in large part on the effectiveness of the political process after
the constitution is written.
In December 2005, elections were held for the first four-year term government. In order
to fix the imbalance of the January election and encourage Sunnis to vote, 230 of the 275-seat
Council of Representatives was allocated based on population, ensuring that there would be a
more even split of seats.351 Most insurgent organizations did not threaten polling stations and in
some cases even provided protection; with Al-Qaeda being the major exception.352 With many
Sunnis viewing their boycott of the January elections as a mistake, Sunni participation would be
much higher in this round of elections, and it showed in the results. Sunni parties won 44 seats in
the Council of Representatives, equating to 16% of the total.353
By 2006, despite early struggles, the United States had successfully brought about a
democracy in Iraq that represented everyone. While tensions still remained, past compromises
and the Sunnis’ realization that they needed to engage with the political system were significant
progress in creating a unified Iraq. Throughout this process, America had served as a mediator,
pushing sides to compromise and helping to find common ground. These efforts would lay the
ground work for ending the insurgency which, by 2006, threatened to turn into all-out civil war.
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The Anbar Awakening
The biggest turning point in the Iraq War was the so-called “Anbar Awakening” from
2006 to 2007. The Awakening occurred in the “Sunni Triangle” in western Iraq. The various
Sunni tribes in this region, which had previously been a part of the insurgency, allied with the
central government to fight Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which had become the largest insurgent
organization in the country. The tribes would switch their allegiance for a variety of reasons.
Some would do so to revenge a relative killed by AQI. Others would revolt because of AlQaeda’s brutal policies. Others would fight due to Al-Qaeda diminishing their own power. AlQaeda believed the tribal system to be un-Islamic and sought to replace it with an Islamic form
of government, with tribal leaders often left out. All of these motivations would come together to
bring about a general antipathy towards Al-Qaeda and a re-evaluation of the new Iraqi
government.354
The government was able to win the majority of the population’s support because, simply
put, the government offered a better deal than Al-Qaeda. Regular civilians could escape from AlQaeda’s brutal regime and tribal leaders saw greater potential for positions of power in the
government’s political system than under Al-Qaeda. While officials both in the Iraqi government
and American military were hesitant to ally with former enemies, the very fact that tribal leaders
were able to negotiate helped to attract tribal loyalties. Al-Qaeda, when confronted with rebellion
among its tribal allies, used violence and intimidation rather than diplomacy. 355 Thus, leaders in
the Sunni Triangle were faced with a choice between an organization that increasingly
diminished their power while threatening them if they did not accept their place, and a
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government which was offering positions as leaders of their community and, perhaps in the
future, even on the national stage.356
The United States would be integral to this Awakening, with the U.S. spending $370
million to employ around 100,000 Sunni militiamen, called the “Sons of Iraq”.357 The United
States would also help to smooth relations between tribal leaders and government officials.358
After the Awakening tribal fighters were either integrated into the police, or given civil service
jobs. Tribal leaders participated in elections, winning various positions within both the local and
national government.359 With greater security also came U.S. reconstruction contracts, which
both Anbar’s population and its leaders benefitted from.
The Anbar Awakening seemed to be a success for nation-building. Yes, the United States
had made several mistakes during its year of occupation that had exacerbated tensions between
the Sunnis and Shias. However, despite these mistakes, the Anbar Awakening showed the
creating a representative political system allows the government to take advantage of insurgent
mistakes. The political system that the U.S. helped bring about gave the tribes an avenue for
negotiation and cooperation against a common enemy. Just as in their efforts to create a
democracy, Americans had served a pivotal role in both financing the Awakening and serving as
mediators to ensure negotiations went smoothly. While the insurgency would never fully end,
violence would dramatically decrease from 2008 to 2012 as former insurgents now worked with
the government rather than fighting it.360
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Rise of the Islamic State
The sectarian politics of Prime Minister Maliki’s administration (2006-2014) would
ultimately cause a reversal of progress. In the run up to the 2010 elections, over 500 candidates
were disqualified for being ex-Baathists, with Sunni parties disproportionally affected.361 In what
would be described as a “difficult” and “strained” meeting, the U.S. Ambassador would attempt
to convince Maliki to take steps to moderate de-Baathification, saying that the disqualifications
looked politically motivated. Maliki countered that the disqualified candidates were treated
fairly, that Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq was secretly a hardline Baathist, and
“dismissed the risk of any political crisis.”362
When Ayad Allawi’s Iraq National Movement (INM) coalition, which included many of
the Sunni political parties, won the most seats in the Council of Representatives, it was thought
that Allawi would be able to form a new government. However, the Supreme Court determined
that a coalition could form after the election and combine their votes, which allowed the Shia
coalitions to overtake Allawi’s INM. Although a power-sharing arrangement was devised in
which the INM obtained ten ministerial posts, many Sunnis viewed the election as a defeat taken
from the jaws of victory. To the Sunnis, they had rightfully won the election but were denied due
to the Shia banding together against them.363
At the same time, the INM had won 91 seats, or 28% of the total.364 These numbers also
do not include Sunnis who were a part of other smaller coalitions. Thus, the Sunnis were fairly
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represented in Iraq’s legislature. If the Shia and the Maliki administration in particular moderated
de-Baathification and continued to ensure Sunnis were part of the post-Saddam political system,
conflict could be avoided. Unfortunately, this did not occur.
Persecution would increase in the next two years as Maliki sought to increase his power
by promoting his allies, who tended to be Shia, and persecuting his enemies, who tended to be
Sunni. This was due to his constant fear of a Sunni coup. Former Iraqi Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad recalled that, “More than once, I would meet with him, and he would tell me about
elaborate conspiratorial plots on the part of Sunni Arab leaders and former Baathists, who, he
alleged, were scheming to take power.”365 In a 2009 cable, then U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan
Crocker argued that Maliki’s attitude toward the Sunni population is “deeply informed by the
Shi'a historical experience.”366 As described earlier, the Sunnis have historically been the leaders
of Iraq, to the detriment of the Shia. Thus, while Maliki faced opposition from both the Shia and
the Sunnis, he needed to pay particular attention to his Sunni opponents as they were arguably
more motivated to enact a coup.
This paranoia caused Maliki to distrust much of Iraq’s military and intelligence
leadership. Sunni military officers were increasingly marginalized, especially in the higher ranks.
In 2013, 11 of the 14 division commanders were Shia and all of the regional commands, which
oversee these divisions, were led by Shias.367 Maliki also created the Office of the Commander
in Chief (OCINC), which allowed him to circumvent the regular chain of command and give
orders directly to field commanders. The OCINC is dominated by the Shia, with only four of its
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twenty-four members being Sunni.368
The National Police were also affected. In the city of Samarra for example, a list of
successful candidates for the National Police was submitted in which 60% of the new officers
would be Shia and 40% Sunni. Created by a Sunni officer, the list was meant to reflect the
demographics of the city. However, the list was changed by the central government so that 87%
of the incoming officers were Shia.
On December 19, 2011, an arrest warrant was issued for Sunni Vice President Tariq alHashimi, accusing him of assassinating political opponents. Hashimi was in Kurdistan at the
time and was thus beyond the reach of the central government in Baghdad. The arrest warrant
and later trial in absentia was called politically motivated by Hashimi’s allies. After Hashimi
moved to Turkey, Interpol placed a warrant for his arrest but later retracted it after evidence
given by the Iraqi government “lacked quality.”369
On December 20, 2012, Sunni Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi’s entire security detail was
arrested. This event would set off months of protests, as the arrests were seen as the last straw of
a long list of Sunnis arrested for supposed terrorism.370 As Hamid Ahmed said in a speech in
Fallujah, “It was Hashimi first. Essawi now. Who knows who it will be next? The conspiracy
against the Sunnis will never stop. We will not keep silent for this.”371
On April 23, 2013, the Iraqi Security Forces raided a protest camp in the city of Hawija
in northern Iraq, leading to the deaths of 40 civilians and three ISF officers. In response Sunnis
368
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attacked and briefing occupied government checkpoints and buildings.372 Sectarian tensions
would increase even more when the government arrested Iraq parliamentarian Ahmed al-Alwani.
This would result in a gunfight which killed 17 officers, Alwani’s brother, and several of
Alwani’s bodyguards.373 On December 30, the government would attempt to break up a protest
camp in Ramadi that would lead to fighting between tribal forces and the government. This infighting would allow the Islamic State, which had formally been established in April 2013, the
ability to take territory in Ramadi and Fallujah just a couple days later.374
Politically, the protests would cause forty-four Sunni members of the Council of
Representatives to resign.375 The 2014 elections for the Council of Representatives would see the
Sunnis politically fragmented and result in a victory of only 53 seats, compared to the 91 seats in
the 2010 election.376 The Sunnis had, for the most part, disengaged from politics and were
instead voicing their frustrations on the battlefield. As Hashimi would explain, “Al Qaeda, the
extremists, enjoyed this changing of identity of the youngest of the Sunni communities. They
tried to recruit more of them. All of them were angry, frustrated, and lost hope in the political
process, in democratic peace.”377 During the protests, the United States had taken a largely
passive role. The Obama administration reportedly did not put heavy pressure on Maliki to
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reform.378 This was largely due to the protests being viewed as an internal matter and not cause
for serious concern. By the time the U.S. realized how serious the situation had become, the
Islamic State had already gained a strong foothold in the country.

Conclusion
Soon after America captured Baghdad, a crowd gathered in Firdos Square around a statue
of Saddam. The Iraqis hit it with sledgehammers and tied a rope around it to try and bring it
down, but were unsuccessful. After a few hours it seemed as if it would never come down; but
then an American M88 recovery vehicle arrived on the scene. Attaching a chain to the neck of
the statue, the vehicle easily pulled it down. Two months later, a replacement statue was erected.
Made out of plaster and painted green to look as if it was aged bronze, by 2013 the statue’s paint
was fading away and parts of it had broken off. The toppling of the Saddam statue was an iconic
moment in the invasion, being seen as symbolic of the struggles of Iraq to depose Saddam and
the ease with which America would eventually do so. Yet its replacement statue is just as
symbolic. Built with cheap materials in order to be completed quickly, it was painted to look like
something greater than it actually was. The flaws in its construction would become ever clearer
as time went on, before finally being taken down in 2013.379
Like the Firdos Square statue, nation-building in Iraq had at first seemed a success. While
creating a new government had been difficult, the Anbar Awakening seemed to show that what
America had helped to bring about was worth the effort. Although flawed, the government of
Iraq offered a better alternative than what the Al-Qaeda insurgents were promising. Yet it was
378
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only a temporary victory. While Iraq seemed to be stable after the Awakening, cracks soon
emerged that proved America had not been as successful in creating a unified nation as
previously thought. Whether the initial mistakes made by the American occupation or those
made by Iraqis themselves is more to blame is debatable, and in either case there is likely to be
blame on both sides. What Iraq shows though is the difficulties involved in nation-building in a
country where long-held divisions exist. If these divisions did not exist, Iraq might very well
have been a success. However, because they did, every mistake and miscalculation made by the
occupation was intensified by existing tensions. Iraq has become the nation-building example of
"winning the battle but losing the war.” America’s efforts helped stop the initial conflict, but
would lead to an even bigger conflict that ultimately puts the future stability of the country into
question.
The fake bronze statue in Firdos Square would be replaced by an actual bronze
monument that is three times as tall.380 Whether this new statue will represent Iraq after the
defeat of the Islamic State is yet to be seen.
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FINAL ANALYSIS

The first aspect in evaluating nation-building is the final result of the case studies. In
South Vietnam, the country was invaded by the North just two years after the U.S. withdrawal.
In El Salvador, the conflict ultimately ended with a peace deal. In Iraq, despite an initial victory
in 2008, by 2014 the insurgency had revived even stronger than before. Afghanistan is still in
conflict, though recent peace talks suggest that the war will eventually end in a draw. Thus, out
of the four case studies, two are failures (Vietnam and Iraq) and two can be considered draws (El
Salvador and Afghanistan).
The most successful counterinsurgency America has been involved in was in El Salvador.
If one measures success by the primary objective of America’s leaders, which were the
prevention of a Communist government rather than necessarily the destruction of the rebel
forces, then it would be considered a victory. El Salvador also only cost about $4 billion in total
which even with inflation would be less than $10 billion.381 Compare this to Vietnam, where just
economic assistance cost over $8.5 billion, which would equate to around $64 billion in 2019.382
The U.S. spent $60.64 billion on reconstruction in Iraq by 2013 and Afghanistan reconstruction
has cost $132.5 billion by July 2019.383 Thus, out of the four case studies, El Salvador not only
had the best result, but also used the least amount of money. However, El Salvador had already
had a relatively effective government with an established security force and developed
infrastructure. Thus, it did not require the level of reconstruction or development that Vietnam,
381
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Afghanistan, and Iraq required.
In none of the cases was America fully able to transform the state it was involved in.
Progress was made to varying degrees, but in only one instance was the host-nation able to
convince the rebel forces to lay down their arms, which was Iraq during the Anbar Awakening.
Yet even this proved temporary and was as much due to Al-Qaeda’s mistakes as Iraq’s
successes. El Salvador eventually had a negotiated peace, but this was not a case where the
government solved its core problems and convinced the rebel forces to lay down its arms. El
Salvador was only able to make transformative changes when both sides realized that victory
was not possible. Nation-building might have contributed to this by convincing some of those
peasants who were on the fence to join the government, or at least not actively support the
insurgency, but to what extent is not fully known. Vietnam, if the statistics are true, seems to
have made significant progress, but whether this would have led to a victory under different
circumstances is unknown as ultimately the country was conquered through conventional means.
Afghanistan is the worst performing case study as after 18 years it has still not been able to
dampen its internal problems.
The biggest issue with nation-building is that it requires the consent of the nation. The
very fact that there is an insurgency shows that there are deeply ingrained problems with that
society. Those problems often have one side benefitting and others losing, causing resistance to
change. If there was great enthusiasm for changing the system, there would hardly be a need for
an American presence.
There is also the fact that America is not interested in occupying a country to bring about
needed reform. If America had taken direct control over Vietnam and, for example, built the
Strategic Hamlets by itself and instituted the 1970 land reform bill ten years earlier, maybe the
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Viet Cong would have died out in the early 1960s. However, America does not like to directly
control a country’s affairs like a colonial power. Even during the occupation of Iraq, there was
pressure for the occupation to end quickly, both by Americans and Iraqis.
One could make the argument that if America had applied more pressure, such as
threatening to retract aid if certain reform were not met, there would be greater success.
However, there also is not much evidence that America is capable of successfully pressuring a
country to bring about such change. Even when America is the primary benefactor, such as in El
Salvador, foreign governments tend to have a limit on how much they will reform and how
quickly. Yet even a limited amount of reform could be useful. If America had applied more
pressure on the Iraq government after the Anbar Awakening, while sectarian tensions would still
exist, perhaps those tensions would not have risen to the point of armed conflict. In the future, a
quid-pro-quo policy of reforms for development aid could lead to better results, at least in some
cases.
Overall, it is the conclusion of this paper that nation-building during wartime is of limited
effectiveness. Devoting serious resources to it as some have suggested, is likely not to lead to a
remarkable change in results. This does not mean that nation-building as a defense policy is
useless. Successful nation-building does not necessarily mean outright victory. In many cases it
will mean a negotiated settlement; which may be the same as victory as long as it achieves
lasting peace and stability. The goal being that the government can be reformed enough so that
either the insurgents view that government as tolerable to negotiate with, or the more moderate
portions of the insurgency stop fighting. A similar goal has been proposed in the “Stakeholdercentric” counterinsurgency strategy, in which the objective is to create the political environment
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for negotiations between the warring parties rather than for one to outright defeat the other.384
While such a strategy will not prove successful in every context, the mindset that nationbuilding’s purpose is to create the foundation for change rather than to completely fix that
society’s ills is a better representation of what nation-building offers.
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